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I. INTRODUCTION

Coal mining significantly contributes to West Virginia's economy.2
Coal mining also disturbs West Virginia's environment during, and sometimes
after, its pendency.
Multiple laws have been enacted over the years in an effort to avoid,
minimize, and correct environmental disturbances caused by mining. Unfortunately, these laws have not fully prevented, minimized, or resulted in the correction of mining's environmental disturbances. As a result, today a number of
abandoned mine sites sit unreclaimed, and polluted streams affected by some of
those abandoned mining sites go untreated. In 1999, it was estimated that 481
Virginia were damaged
waterways, and 2,852 miles of those waterways, in West
3
by pollution discharges from abandoned mine sites.
Recent changes in West Virginia's reclamation bonding laws have attempted to reduce the number of West Virginia's post-1977 unreclaimed, abandoned mine sites and the pollution being caused by those sites. In particular,
2

According to one estimate, the coal mining industry currently accounts for roughly 13% of

West Virginia's economic output and produces 27% of West Virginia's business tax revenues and
approximately 10% of the state's property tax collections. See OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, U.S.
DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ANNUAL EVALUATION

SUMMARY REPORT FOR THE REGULATORY AND

ABANDONED MINE LAND RECLAMATION PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY THE STATE OF WEST
VIRGINIA FOR EVALUATION YEAR 2003 2-3 [hereinafter ANNUAL EVALUATION SUMMARY 2003],
In 2001, West Virginia proavailable at http://www.osmre.gov/oversight/westvirginia03.pdf
duced 163.2 million tons of coal. Id. at app. A. In 2002, West Virginia produced 150.6 million
tons of coal. Id. This amount of coal production has resulted in West Virginia being the second
largest coal producing state in the United States during the last several years. Id. at 2. During this
same time period, Wyoming was the state that produced the largest amount of coal in the United
States. See OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ANNUAL EVALUATION
SUMMARY REPORTS FOR THE REGULATORY AND ABANDONED MINE LAND RECLAMATION
PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY THE STATE OF WYOMING FOR EVALUATION YEARS 2002 AND 2003,
availableat http://www.osmre.gov/oversight/wyoming03.pdf.
Steve Myers, Mining's Toll on Land Was Heavy; Environment's Recovery From Mining
Will Take Time, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, May 7, 1999, at IA, available at LEXIS, News Library, Charleston Daily Mail File.
3
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those changes provide greater funding and discretion to the West Virginia Department of
Environmental Protection ("DEP") to reclaim those abandoned
4
mine sites.
This article gives a historical perspective on the development of West
Virginia's reclamation bonding laws over the last sixty-four years. Section II of
the article briefly reviews West Virginia's pre-1977 development of a government program to reclaim abandoned mine sites. Section III of the article describes West Virginia's current reclamation bonding program for post-1977
mining sites, Section IV describes the unique bonding problems that pollution
discharges from mines pose, and Section V describes historical inadequacies in
West Virginia's reclamation bonding program. Section VI both recounts and
analyzes recent attempts to improve West Virginia's reclamation bonding program through legislation and other means while Section VII briefly gives review
and comment by the United States District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia on the changes made by Senate Bill 5003 to West Virginia's
bonding and reclamation program. Section VIII of the article analyzes the effect
of these recent changes as measured by data collected and assembled by and for
the Special Reclamation Advisory Council. Section IX offers a brief prediction
on the future of the current laws relating to West Virginia's Special Reclamation
Program.
II. WEST VIRGINIA'S PRE-1977 RECLAMATION OF ABANDONED COAL MINING
SITES

In 1939, the West Virginia Legislature first recognized the need to regulate surface coal mining in West Virginia through its passage of House Bill
390. 5 House Bill 390 was the first law in the United States which set perform-6
ance standards the coal industry was required to meet while mining coal.
House Bill 390 contained several important provisions, among them were provisions which: (1) required a person extracting coal for commercial purposes to
obtain a permit authorizing such extraction prior to extraction, (2) required
mined land be re-contoured to a condition that approximated the pre-mining
condition of the land, (3) required coal operators to "minimize hazards to...
The regulatory entity in West Virginia in charge of regulating the surface effects of underground coal mining and surface coal mining is currently known as the West Virginia Department
of Environmental Protection. The Department of Environmental Protection has previously been
known by several different names, including the Division of Energy and the Division of Environmental Protection. For ease of reading, this article will use the generic term "DEP" to refer to all
of those entities.
4

Interoffice Memorandum from Roger T. Hall, West Virginia Division of Environmental
Protection, to Dennis Boyles, Office of Surface Mining, Ben Greene, West Virginia Mining and
Reclamation Association, and Bill Raney, West Virginia Coal Association 3 (Sept. 29, 1998) (on
file with author).
5

6

Id.
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pollution of streams," 7 and (4) required each mining operation to post a reclamation performance bond with the State for each mining permit that the operation
received from the State. 8 This performance bond was required in an attempt to
ensure that if a coal company defaulted on its obligation to reclaim the mined
land after mining had been completed, there would still be a reserve of money
(i.e. the reclamation bond) that could be used to pay for necessary reclamation.
Despite these regulatory efforts and the creation of a vehicle to pay for
the reclamation of an abandoned coal mining site, many coal companies left
their mining sites unreclaimed after completing their mining operations and
West Virginia was stuck with paying for the reclamation of the abandoned mine
site. When the State could collect the performance bond associated with the
abandoned mine site, the amount of money collected was often less than the
amount of money it took to pay for reclamation.
In 1963, the West Virginia Legislature revisited the issue of regulating
coal minin and imposed a special fee of $30 per acre on areas to be disturbed
by mining. The Legislature also required each mining operator to post a reclamation bond for a site in the amount of $500 per acre. 10 The $30 fee imposed
by the Legislature was directed into a fund, referred to as the Special Reclamation Fund ("SRF"), which the State used for the restoration and reclamation of
lands disturbed by a coal mining entity but abandoned by that entity prior to the
time that entity completed site reclamation. The SRF attempted to reclaim as
many abandoned mine sites as possible.12 Unfortunately, the SRF reclaimed
13
only a small percentage of those lands that had been previously abandoned.
On these pre-1977 sites, the State backfilled open mining pits "with the
great mounds of rock and soil that had been indiscriminately cast aside to expose and extract the coal."'14 "In many cases, there was insufficient material
available or it was not cost effective to [also] eliminate [the] highwalls" which
had been created during the mining operation.1 5 As a result, level benches and
exposed highwalls, which typically coursed along the coal seam along with the
Id. At the time House Bill 390 was passed, "stream pollution" meant erosion, siltation, and
coal fines. Id. Later, this term took on a broader meaning, encompassing other types of stream
pollution such as Acid Mine Drainage. Id. at 4.
8
Id. at3.
7

W. VA. DIV. OF ENVTL. PROT., DEP'T OF COMMERCE, LABOR, & ENVTL. RES., ACID MINE
DRAINAGE BOND FORFEITURE REPORT 1 (1993) [hereinafter BOND FORFEITURE REPORT].
9

16

Id.

1

Interoffice Memorandum from Roger T. Hall to Dennis Boyles, supra note 5, at 5.

12

Id.

13

Id.

14

Id. at 6.

is

Id.
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natural contours of the land, were left on the permitted site following the comWater ran over the face of the
pletion of the State's reclamation of the site.
exposed highwalls during the weathering process and leached various minerals
out of the open rock face. 17 This leaching out of minerals from the exposed
highwall face caused pollution discharges from mining, including in some cases,
acid mine drainage ("AMD"). 18 While that reclamation result is today seen as
unacceptable, at that time the production of AMD from the exposed highwall
was not seen as a major problem. Indeed, prior to 1977, the elimination of
AMD and other pollution discharges was more often by chance than design, as
not in and of itself a goal of
treatment and elimination of these discharges was
19
West Virginia's Special Reclamation Program.
Between 1968 and 1971, many West Virginia residents became part of a
nationwide movement which called for environmental reform.2 0 One of the
21
goals of this movement was to abolish surface coal mining in its entirety.
While this goal was never met, the movement did succeed in achieving several
other goals. The success of this movement was reflected in legislation passed
by the West Virginia Legislature in the early 1970s. For example, in the early
1970s, the Legislature prohibited mining operations in 22 of West Virginia's 55
counties. 22 The Legislature also expanded the regulation of mining and reclamation, increased the SRF fee from its previous rate of $30 per acre of mined
land to a rate of $60 per acre of mined land, and increased the per acre bonding
rate from $500 to $1000. 23 While these moves generated more revenue for the
Special Reclamation Program, they still did not produce enough revenue to pay
for reclamation of all abandoned mine sites.
In 1974 and again in 1976, the State Legislature amended the West Virginia Surface Mining Act to regulate both surface coal mining operations and
the surface effects of underground mining operations.24 As a result of this
16

Id.

17

Id.

18

Id. Acid mine drainage is defined legally as "water discharged from an active, inactive, or

abandoned surface mine and reclamation operation or from areas affected by surface mining and
reclamation operations with said water having a pH of less than six (6.0) in which total acidity
exceeds total alkalinity." W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 38-2-2(2.3) (2004). Acid mine drainage from
bituminous coal mines contains high concentrations of acidic sulfates, especially ferrous sulfates.
DICTIONARY OF MINING TERMS 7 (Paul W. Thrush ed., Maclean Hunter Publishing Company
1990) (1968).
19
Interoffice Memorandum from Roger T. Hall to Dennis Boyles, supra note 5, at 6.
20

Id. at5.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

BOND FORFEITURE REPORT, supra note 9, at 1.

24

Interoffice Memorandum from Roger T. Hall to Dennis Boyles, supra note 5, at 6.
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change, both underground and surface coal mining permittees were required to
post bonds which would insure the reclamation of surface •areas in•the25event that
reclamation.
the permittee defaulted on his obligation to complete site
The new requirements regulating surface effects of underground mining
were helpful because they ensured that surface areas disturbed by both underground and surface mining would not be left to harm the environment following
mining. However, these new requirements also placed additional financial burdens on both coal mining permittees and DEP. Because of the change in the
law, whenever an underground mining operation did not properly reclaim its
surface disturbances, the State became financially responsible for the reclamation of those disturbances.
III. THE PASSAGE OF SMCRA

AND ITS BONDING REQUIREMENTS

By 1977, a large number of mining sites, not only in West Virginia but
also across the nation, lay abandoned and unreclaimed. The Surface Coal Mining and Reclamation Act ("SMCRA") was passed by the United States Congress
in August 1977 in response to many problems associated with the mining indussites which
try, including the large number of unreclaimed or under reclaimed
operations. 2 6
were being produced as a result of various coal mining
SMCRA requires that, following the completion of mining extraction
activities, a permittee must reclaim, or pay for the reclamation of, the mined site
in accordance with SMCRA's various performance requirements.27 To assure
this will be done, SMCRA requires the permittee to do two things before beginning mining operations: (1) submit a reclamation plan to the appropriate regulatory authority demonstrating how the mining operator will comply with
SMCRA's reclamation standards; 28 and (2) post a reclamation bond after the
permit application has been approved but before mining starts.29 Reclamation
bonds are controlled by statutory requirements; when the terms of a bond conflict with statutory requirements, the statute controls. 30 The reclamation bond is
important because it assures that if the permittee does not properly reclaim environmental disturbances created during mining, those disturbances will still be
reclaimed.31
25

Id.

26

See 30 U.S.C. § 1201(h) (2000).

27

See id.§§ 1259(a), 1265(b); OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,

OVERVIEW:

RECLAMATION

BONDS

FOR COAL

MINING

OPERATIONS,

available at http://

www.osmre.gov/bonding.htm (Dec. 30, 2002).
See 30 U.S.C. § 1257(d).
28
29

See id. § 1259(a).

30

See Martin v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 570 A.2d 122, 126 (Pa. Commw, Ct. 1990).

31

See 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a). The requirement to post a reclamation bond for each operation
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The United States' Office of Surface Mining and Reclamation Enforcement's ("OSM's") rules recognize three major categories of reclamation
bonds: (1) corporate surety bonds, (2) collateral bonds (including cash, certificates of deposit, first-lien interests in real estate, letters of credit, federal, state or
municipal bonds, and investment-grade securities), and (3) self bonds (i.e. legally binding corporate promise with or without separate surety, available only
to permittees who meet certain financial tests.) 32 A surety reclamation bond is a
guarantee that a third party surety will either perform the defaulting permittee's
reclamation obligations or pay the regulatory authority (the obligee on the bond)
a sum certain if the principal (the operator) fails to perform reclamation as required by the bond agreement. 33 A collateral bond is an indemnity agreement
executed by the permittee and supported by a deposit with the regulatory authority of cash, negotiable bonds, certificates of deposit, letters of credit or certified

checks in the full amount of the bond. 34 A self-bond is an indemnity agreement
executed by the permittee, the permittee's parent company, or a qualified third
35
party.

The regulatory authority implementing the traditional Section 509(a)
SMCRA bonding scheme will require the reclamation bond to be performance
in nature, though a regulatory authority implementing an Alternative Bonding
Program may require the bond to be penal in nature. If the reclamation penal

bond is backed by a third party surety, the surety has the option of paying the
amount of the forfeited bond to the obligee or performing the permittee's reclamation obligations upon the permittee's default. 37 As provided by 30 C.F.R. §
permitted under SMCRA was thought by Congress to be a vital component of a nationwide program to control coal mining's impacts on the environment. S. REP. No. 95-128, at 78 (1977). In
describing the reclamation bond provisions of the Act, the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources referred to SMCRA's bonding scheme as "one of the most important aspects of [a]
program to regulate surface mining and reclamation." Id.
32
See 30 C.F.R. § 800.5 (2004).
33

See id. § 800.5(a); see also Barlow Burke, Reclaiming the Law of Suretyship, 21 S. ILL. U.

L.J. 449,470 (1997).
3
See 30 C.F.R. § 800.5(b); see also id. § 800.21.
35

See id. § 800.5(c).

36

Performance bonds are required by the terms of SMCRA itself. See 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a).

The decision in In re Permanent Surface Mining Regulation Litigation cast doubt on whether
penal bonds may be used by states that implement a traditional SMCRA bonding program. 14
ERC (BNA) 1083, 1100-01 (D.D.C. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 14 ERC (BNA) 1813
(D.C. Cir. 1980). However, at least according to OSM, penal bonds may clearly be required by a
state regulatory agency, such as the West Virginia's Department of Environmental Protection, that
is implementing an Alternative Bonding Program in lieu of the traditional bonding program established by 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a). See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 60 Fed Reg. 51,900 (October 4, 1995). See infra Part IV for a discussion concerning Alternative Bonding Systems.
37

See Burke, supra note 33, at 470.
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800.50(d)(2), if the amount of the forfeited performance bond is more than the
amount necessary to complete the reclamation, any unused funds must be returned to the party from whom they were collected. 38 If the reclamation bond is
a penal one, the amount of the bond is typically taken in forfeiture by the regulatory authority, and all proceeds of the bond are retained by the regulatory authority regardless of the actual cost of site reclamation the bond was designed to
39
ensure.
Prior to SMCRA, reclamation bonds were often set so low that it cost
the mining permittee more money to reclaim environmental disturbances created
during mining than to simply leave the mined site unreclaimed, forgo the return
of the bond from either the regulatory agency
or a third party• surety,
•
• 40and repeat
this process whenever the permittee moved on to another mine site.
As a result of this financial advantage in not completing reclamation, the permittee
might mine several permitted areas successively without completing reclamation
on any of them. This practice was be advantageous to the permittee but disadvantageous to the environment.
Four features of SMCRA are designed to chill this environmentally irresponsible practice. First, if a permittee does not complete his or her reclamation
responsibilities and the regulatory authority is forced to issue violations against
the permittee, revoke the permittee's permit, and forfeit the reclamation bond
associated with the permit, the defaulting permittee is blocked from receiving
future mining permits in the United States. 4 1 Second, the regulatory authority
can collect from the permittee the difference between the total cost of reclaiming
the permit and the amount of the bond posted for the permit if the posted bond is
not large enough by itself to pay for site reclamation. 42 As observed by one
court, "the imposition of all [excess] reclamation costs on [coal] operators is
consistent with and supported by the legislative history of SMCRA." 4 3 Third,
the regulatory agency, not the operator, is the entity that determines how much it
38

30 C.F.R. § 800.50(d)(2).

39

See Burke, supra note 33, at 470.

40

See Robert Costanza and Laura Cornwell, The 4P Approach to Dealing With Scientific

Uncertainty, 34 ENv'T 9 (1992).
41
See 30 U.S.C. § 1260(c) (2000).
42
DEP'T

See 30 C.F.R. § 800.50(d)(1); see also OLGA BRUNNING, OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, U.S.
OF

THE

INTERIOR,

COALEX

REPORT

251

(1993),

available

at

http://

www.omre.gov/coalex/coalex251.htm (quoting H.C. Bostic Coal Co., Inc. and Wayne Bostic v.

OSM, Docket Nos. NX-88-8-R. et al., Interior Administrative Decisions 1991)). West Virginia
has a counterpart to 30 C.F.R. § 800.50(d)(1). See W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 38-2-12(12.4) (2004).
While this option is available to the regulatory authority in theory, it is often not available in practice as the company whose permit the authority is attempting to reclaim is often bereft of assets
and thus collection of such excess reclamation costs is rendered impossible.
43 Cat Run Coal Co. v. Babbitt, 932 F. Supp. 772, 780 (S.D. W. Va. 1996).
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will cost to reclaim the mined land. 44 Fourth, and perhaps most importantly, a
reclamation bond required pursuant to SMCRA is designed to pay for all proin the event the permittee is unable (or unwilling) to
jected costs of reclamation
45
complete the reclamation.
When calculating how much the reclamation bond should be, the regulatory agency must examine how much it will cost it to complete the permit's
reclamation plan and adhere to all environmental performance standards in the
process.4 6 According to OSM, bond calculations should "reflect the 'worst case
scenario', i.e., the cost of reclaiming the site if the permittee forfeits the bond at
the point of maximum reclamation cost liabili4', under the reclamation and operation plans approved as part of the permit." 4 If OSM has approved an "Alternative Bonding System" within a state that has achieved primacy,4 8 that Alternative Bonding System "must [also] assure that the regulatory authority will
the reclamation plan for any areas
have available sufficient money to complete
49
which may be in default at any time."
It is significant that the regulatory agency must calculate the reclamation bond amount based on how much it will cost the regulatory agency, not the
mining entity, to complete reclamation. Often it will cost a regulatory agency
more money to complete reclamation of an unreclaimed site than it would have
cost the mining entity to perform the same reclamation of that site. One reason
for this is that a public agency such as DEP must pay laborers and contractors
on a government financed reclamation project more money than those laborers
and contractors might have to be paid if those laborers and contractors were
working directly for the mining entity. Whereas a contractor working for a private mining entity would be able to negotiate the hourly wage rates paid to electricians, carpenters, etc., a state agency such as DEP does not have this luxury.
DEP must, through the contractor it hires, pay a skilled laborer a minimum
hourly rate on each contract it lets. 50 The establishment of an artificial floor for
wage rates makes the overall cost of reclamation higher on each contract let by
44

See 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a); see also 30 C.F.R. 800.14(a).

45

See 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a); 30 CFR 800.50(b)(2).

46

See 30 U.S.C. § 1259(a).

47

OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, HANDBOOK FOR CALCULATION OF

RECLAMATION

BOND

tives/directive882a.pdf

AMOUNTS

6

(2000),

available at

http://www.osmre.gov/direc-

[hereinafter HANDBOOK FOR CALCULATION OF RECLAMATION

BOND

AMOUNTS]; see also W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 238 F. Supp. 2d 761, 766 (S.D. W.
Va. 2003); OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, RECLAMATION BONDING
REQUIREMENTS AT THE WESTERN REGIONAL COORDINATING CENTER (2002), available at

http://www.osmre.gov/bonding.htm.
48

See infra Part IV.

49

30 C.F.R. § 800.1 1(e).

50

See W.Va. Code § 21-5A-I to -11 (2004).
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the DEP and makes it more expensive than it otherwise would be for DEP to
reclaim the abandoned mine site. Unfortunately, DEP cannot pass the higher
cost of reclaiming the abandoned mine land onto the operator as the operator is,
by the time that such reclamation is needed, usually bankrupt or bereft of assets.
IV.

WEST VIRGINIA'S IMPLEMENTATION OF SMCRA's BONDING
REQUIREMENTS

SMCRA permits a state to assume primacy for the regulation of surface
coal mining and reclamation operations within its borders by demonstrating that
its program includes a "state law which provides for the regulation of surface
coal mining and reclamation operations in accordance with the requirements" of
SMCRA and rules and regulations consistent with regulations issued by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to SMCRA. 5 1 While there is some debate as to
whether and to what extent SMCRA is "pre-empted" in a state that has achieved
primacy over the regulation of coal mining within its borders, it can be fairly
said that a state that has achieved primacy administers its own regulatory program over mining within that state. West Virginia made several attempts to
obtain primacy over the regulation of coal mining within its borders following
the passage of SMCRA in 1977. 52 West Virginia finally obtained primacy over
its coal mining regulatory program on January 21, 1981.53 The statutory portion
of West Virginia's primacy program is known54 as the West Virginia Surface
Coal Mining and Reclamation Act ("SCMRA").
51

30 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1), (7).

'State primacy' refers to the period of time during which a state's surface mining regulatory program has the primary role in the enforcement of surface mining statutes and regulations in accordance with federal guidelines. During this period, the federal government, through the Office of
Surface Mining (OSM) in the United States Department of the Interior, assumes an oversight
function.
Burke, supra note 33, at 463 n.65.
52

In response to the passage of SMCRA in 1977, the West Virginia Legislature passed and
amended various state statutes in its attempt to achieve primacy over the regulation of coal mining
in West Virginia. On March 3, 1980, West Virginia presented its permanent program for primacy
to the United States Department of the Interior for approval. See Partial Approval/Partial Disapproval of the Permanent Program Submission from the State of West Virginia Under the Surface
Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 45 Fed. Reg. 69,249, 69,249 (Oct. 20, 1980). In
response, the Secretary of the Interior approved the program in part and disproved it in part on
October 20, 1980. Id.
5

On December 19, 1980, West Virginia resubmitted its proposed permanent program package with required amendments that the Secretary of the Interior conditionally approved on January
21, 1981. See Conditional Approval of the Permanent Program Submission from the State of
West Virginia Under the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 46 Fed. Reg.
5915, 5915 (Jan. 21, 1981).
While "SCMRA" technically refers only to the provisions of the West Virginia Code that
regulate the environmental effects of coal mining, the term "SCMRA" will be used throughout
54
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Section 509(c) of SMCRA gives states who have achieved primacy over
the regulation of coal mining within their borders the option to establish an alternative to the traditional reclamation bonding scheme set forth by Section
509(a) of SMCRA.5 5 This "Alternative Bonding System" must achieve the objectives and purposes of the otherwise mandatory conventional bonding program established by Section 509(a) of SMCRA. 56 Specifically, the Alternative
Bonding System must: (1) assure that sufficient funds are available to complete
the reclamation plans for any mining areas in default at any time; and (2) provide a substantial economic incentive for the operator to comply with all reclamation requirements.57 Though the United States Congress did not specify how
SMCRA Section 509(c) Alternative Bonding Systems should be financed, OSM
has stated that
an Alternative Bonding System cannot be allowed to incur a
deficit if it is to have available adequate revenues to complete
the reclamation of all outstanding bond forfeiture sites. Alternative Bonding Systems must include reserves and revenueraising mechanisms adequate to ensure completion of the reclamation plan and fulfillment of the58 pernittee's obligations, including any water treatment needs.
Under the rulings of Canestraro v. Faerber,59 Shultz v. Consolidation
Coal, and a litany of subsequent West Virginia Supreme Court decisions,
SCMRA in general must be consistent with and as stringent as federal
SMCRA. 61 Under these decisions, however, the provisions of West Virginia's
this article to refer to all parts of West Virginia's primacy program, including provisions found in
the Code of State Rules which are part of that program.
55

30 U.S.C. § 1259(c).

56

See id.

57

See 30 CFR § 800.11 (e) (2004).

58

West Virginia Regulatory Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 51,900, 51,910 (Oct. 4, 1995). Unfortunately, these goals are not always met. For example, during 2002, the State of Maryland faced a

$524,760 deficit in its Alternative Bonding System. UNITED STATES OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING
RECLAMATION AND ENFORCEMENT, PITTSBURGH FIELD DIVISION, ALTERNATIVE BONDING SYSTEM

STATUS UPDATE, MARYLAND REGULATORY PROGRAM 3 (2004) (on file with author). Due to
changes in Maryland's Alternative Bonding System, however, it is projected that this deficit will
be eliminated by the end of the year 2004. Id.
59

374 S.E.2d 319 (W. Va. 1988).

60

475 S.E.2d 467 (W. Va. 1996).

61

See Canestraro, 374 S.E.2d at 320; Shultz, 475 S.E.2d at 475-76.

The provisions of

SCMRA can also be more stringent than SMCRA, though as a practical matter, it has appeared to

this attorney in his practice that such a situation seldom occurs. For provisions of state SCMRA
to be more stringent than SMCRA, the Secretary of the Department of Environmental Protection
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SCMRA do not have to be exactly the same as those of SMCRA. This distinction, along with the Alternative Bonding System provisions of Section 509(c) of
SMCRA, have allowed West Virginia to establish an Alternative Bonding System which exhibits characteristics different than those of a traditional SMCRA
Section 509(a) reclamation bonding program.
The basic form of West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System today is
essentially a result of changes to West Virginia mining laws made by the West
Virginia Legislature in 1978. These 1978 changes included: (1) replacing the
previous $60 per acre mine fee with a one cent per ton tax on coal produced, (2)
consolidating in one central fund monies accrued as a result of bond forfeitures,
(3) providing that civil penalties collected pursuant to the West Virginia regulatory program be placed in the SRF, (4) raising the bond rate from seven hundred
and fifty dollars ($750) dollars to one thousand dollars ($1000) per disturbed
acre, (5) providing that the State mining regulatory agency could spend a reasonable sum of money on its administration of the state mining and reclamation
program, and (6) diverting the emphasis of West Virginia's reclamation efforts
away from sites which could be reclaimed under SMCRA's Abandoned Mine
Lands program towards sites which were not eligible
for funding under
62
SMCRA's Abandoned Mine Lands reclamation law.
Today, West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System has two major financial components: (1) the reclamation bond posted by the permittee, and (2)
the Special Reclamation Fund ("SRF"), which is comprised of a special reclamation tax, forfeited reclamation bonds, administrative civil penalties collected
by DEP, and interest which accrues on the amounts contributed to the SRF by
63
the preceding three sources.
The special reclamation tax is a tax on clean coal
64
Virginia.
mined in West
must first provide
specific written reasons which demonstrate that such provisions are reasonably
necessary to protect, preserve or enhance the quality of West Virginia's environment or human health or safety, taking into consideration the scientific evidence,
specific environmental characteristics of West Virginia or an area thereof, or stated

legislative findings, policies or purposes relied upon by the [Secretary] in making
such determination. In the case of specific rules which have a technical basis, the
director shall also provide the specific technical basis upon which the director has
relied.
W. VA. CODE § 22-1-3a (2004). Importantly, West Virginia Code section 22-1-3a continues on to
say that "in the absence of a federal rule, the adoption of a state rule shall not be construed to be
more stringent than a federal rule, unless the absence of a federal rule is the result of a specific
federal exemption." Id.
62 See Interoffice Memorandum from Roger T. Hall to Dennis Boyles, supra note 5, at 7-8.
Realizing that even at the increased bond per acre rate a site's bond might not be sufficient to
reclaim a site, the West Virginia Legislature apparently intended that the SRF make up the difference between the permitted area's bond amount and the amount it took to actually reclaim that site
upon forfeiture. Id.
63
See W. VA. CODE §§ 22-3-1 l(g)-(1), -17(b), (d)(2).
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To meet SMCRA's reclamation bonding requirements, permittees are
allowed to file either a single reclamation bond or separate incremental bonds
for their mining operation. 65 Under a single reclamation bonding scheme, the
bond posted at the time of permit issuance must cover all areas subject to the
permit, even though some sections within the bonded area may not be disturbed
until sometime in the future. 66 Under an incremental bond scheme, the mining
permit area is divided into discrete portions. 67 Each of these portions is bonded
separately from one another. 68 While incremental bonding might appear attractive to coal companies because it prevents them from having to post such a large
bond before they start mining, incremental bonding is sometimes unattractive
bond, this forfeiture prebecause if DEP forfeits a bond, even an incremental 69
permits.
mining
future
getting
from
permittee
the
vents
Bonds posted under West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System were
formerly performance bonds;70 however, they are now penal in nature. 7 1 Under
the penal reclamation bonding scheme, the obligee (that being the State of West
Virginia and the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection) need
not prove actual damages at the time of bond forfeiture as a prerequisite for collecting the entire bond amount. 72 Further, the DEP need not make any preforfeiture inquiry into whether there are less stringent means of enforcement
permittee that do not require DEP to declare forfeiture and collect
against the
73
the bond.
Regardless of whether these are single or incremental in nature, West
Virginia's current penal reclamation bonds may not be less than $1,000 per acre
nor more than $5,000 per acre. 74 Modifying this minimum per acre rate is West
Virginia Code section 22-3-11 (a) which provides that the minimum amount of a
bond required for a permit must be at least $10,000. 75 Thus, under the excep64

See id. § 22-3-1 1(h).

65

See id. § 22-3-1 l(a).

66

See id.; see also GARY MERRITT, DEP'T OF ENVTL. REs., COALEX COMPARISON REPORT 37

(1985) (on file with author).
See W. VA. CODE § 22-3-11 (a); see also MERRrr, supra note 66.
67
68

See MERRITT, supra note 66.

69

W. VA. CODE § 22-3-18(c).

70

See State ex reL. W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. W. Va. Div. of Envtl. Prot., 447

S.E.2d 920, 923 (W. Va. 1994).
l

See W. VA. CODE §§ 22-3-1 l(a), -12(b)(1).

72

See Burke, supra note 33, at 478.

73

See id.

74

W. VA. CODE §§ 22-3-1 1(a), -12(b)(1).

75

W. VA. CODE § 22-3-11 (a).
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tion established by West Virginia Code section 22-3-1 1(a), if a permit is less
than 10 acres in size, that permit must still feature a reclamation bond that is at
least S 10,000.76
Because of the $5,000 per acre statutory restriction on the size of reclamation bonds, reclamation bonds posted for a particular West Virginia mining
operation are sometimes less than the amount of money required to actually
reclaim the permitted area. When this happens, West Virginia's Alternative
77
Bonding System is supposed to provide funding to make up this difference.
Unfortunately, this has, historically, not fully occurred.
V. BONDING POLLUTION DISCHARGES: A MESSY ISSUE UNDER BOTH SMCRA
AND

SCMRA

Pollution discharges from a mine site present particular problems in the
framework of SMCRA and SCMRA reclamation bonding. Untreated pollution
discharges have the potential to pollute nearby streams, impact in-stream aquatic
environments for great distances, and threaten residential drinking water supplies by polluting groundwater sources. 78 Important issues have arisen during
SMCRA's and SCMRA's tenure over how bonding under these two statutory
schemes can be effective on sites featuring pollution discharges. The primary
issue is how can the regulatory authority ensure that the public will not have to
improperly bear the burden of treating pollution discharges if the permittee's
permit is revoked and the bond associated with that revoked permit is forfeited
prior to the termination of the discharge? As OSM has noted, "SMCRA provides no authorization for the transfer of post-mining treatment expenses from
79
the permittee to society at large."
A.

Denial of a Permit Whenever a Post-Mining Pollution Dischargeis
Predicted

It is very difficult to predict with precision or accuracy how long a mine
pollution discharge will last and how much it will cost to remedy that discharge.
Given these problems and given the interest in minimizing harm to the environment from post-mining pollution discharges, the DEP has responded by simply
76

See id. See generally W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 38-2-11(11.5) (2004) (outlining a complicated

bond matrix that DEP applies to determine the size of per acre bonds).
77
78

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 FED. REG. 67,446, 67,447-48 (Dec. 28, 2001).
See Courtney W. Shea, Regulatingfor the Long Term: SMCRA andAcid Mine Drainage,10

J. NAT. REs. & ENvTL. L. 193, 193-194 (1995).
79

OFFICE OF SURFACE

MINING,

U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR,

HYDROLOGIC BALANCE

PROTECTION POLICY GOALS AND OBJECTIVES ON CORRECTING, PREVENTING AND CONTROLLING
AcID/ToxIc MINE DRAINAGE (1996) [hereinafter HYDROLOGIC BALANCE PROTECTION], available
at http://www.osmre.gov/amdpol.txt.
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denying permits whenever the permit application process reveals that a site will
produce post-mining pollution discharges. 80 Denial of a permit which forecasts
a future pollution discharge is the simplest and easiest way to ensure that the
public will not have to improperly pay to treat pollution discharges following
mining.
Denying a mining permit whenever the mine to be permitted is predicted to produce a pollution discharge is supported by Section 515(b)(10) of
SMCRA, which provides that each surface mine must
[m]inimize the disturbances to the prevailing hydrologic balance at the mine-site and in associated offsite areas and to quality and quantity of water in surface and ground water systems
both during and after surface coal mining operations and during
reclamation by (A) avoiding acid or other toxic mine drainage
by such measures as, but not limited to (i) preventing or removing water from contact with toxic producing deposits; (ii) treating drainage to reduce toxic content which adversely affects
downstream water upon being released to water courses; (iii)
casing, sealing, or otherwise managing bore holes, shafts, and
toxic drainage from entering
wells and keep acid or 8other
1
ground and surface waters.
Section 516(b)(9) of SMCRA requires, with respect to underground mines,
the same hydrologic protection requirements as
compliance with substantially
82
section 515(b)(10).
In Rith Energy, Inc., v. OSM, 83 the Interior Board of Land Appeals recognized that OSM is required to avoid acid or other toxic mine drainage under
30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(10)(A) and 30 C.F.R. § 816.41(f) so as to minimize disturbance to the prevailing hydrologic balance. s 4 "Minimizing the contact of water
85
and toxic-producing deposits, as argued by the petitioner, is not the standard."
80

See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Callaghan, W. Va. Surface Mining Board, App. No. 02-

20-SMB (Sept. 2002). Fortunately, knowing, prior to permit issuance, whether a pollution discharge will be created during mining has been made easier over the years. In 1977, West Virginia

constituted an AMD task force to assist in this effort. This task force, comprised of representatives from government, academia, the environmentalist movement, engineering consultants, and
industry drafted and published a blueprint, titled Suggested Guidelinesfor Methods of Operation
in Surface Mining Areas of Areas With Potentially Acid Producing Materials in May of 1978
which identified all methods known at that time for how to control or prevent AMD on surface
mining operations. Interoffice Memorandum from Roger T. Hall to Dennis Boyles, supra note 5,
at 8. Many of these methods were subsequently adopted by industry. Id.
81

30 U.S.C. § 1265(b)(10) (2000).

82

Id.at § 1266(b)(9).

83

111 I.B.L.A. 239 (1989).

84

Id.at 249.
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OSM's policies and reports generally mirror the Rith Energy court's
findings. As a general rule, OSM's policies suggest that a permit should not be
issued whenever the permit application forecasts future pollution discharges
from the permitted area. 86 Over the years, OSM has released two "draft" reports
and one set of comments that address this issue. 87 OSM's 1997 comments,
memorialized in a document titled "Hydrologic Balance Protection Policy Goals
and Objectives on Correcting, Preventing Acid/Toxic Mine Drainage," lists one
of the objectives of the permitting process as preventing off-site material damage to the hydrologic balance and minimizing both on- and off-site disturbances
to the hydrologic balance. 88 According to OSM's 1997 comments, "[fln no case
should a permit be approved if the determination of probable hydrologic consequences or other reliable hydrologic analysis predicts the formation of a postmining pollutional89discharge that would require long-term treatment without a
defined endpoint."
In accord with OSM's stated policy, when a proposed permit in West
Virginia is projected to produce future pollution discharges, DEP analyzes the
permit to see whether the proposed mining operation will create "material damage" to the hydrologic balance outside of the permit area. According to DEP's
Regulation, "[M]aterial damage to the hydrologic balance outside the permit
areas means any long-term or permanent change in the hydrologic balance
caused by surface mining operation(s) which has a significant adverse impact on
the capability of the affected water resource(s) to support existing conditions
and uses." 9 1 While the coal industry and its advocates argue that perpetual
treatment is an acceptable method of meeting SMCRA's requirement for compliance with the Clean Water Act and prevention of material damage to the hydrologic balance off of the permit area, 92 DEP has normally disagreed with this
argument. 93 Typically, if DEP finds that a permit forecasts future pollution dis85

Id.

86

HYDROLOGIC BALANCE PROTECTION, supranote 79.

87

OSM's first "draft" report was issued in 1984 (on file with author). OSM issued a second

"draft" report in 1993 (on file with author). In 1997, OSM issued comments (i.e. clarifications)
concerning its second draft report. See id.
88
Id.
89

Id. In its 1997 comments, which responded to a 1996 Draft of its AMD Policy, OSM stated

that "the [AMD] policy prohibits the approval of surface coal mining operations that would result
in the creation of post-mining (sic) AMD requiring perpetual treatment." Id. "OSM believes that
such operations do not constitute reclamation as envisioned under SMCRA." Id.

90

W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 38-2-3(3.22.e) (2004).

91

Id.

92

See Shea, supra note 78, at 200.

93

See id. at 199 n.30 (citing McElroy Coal Co. v. Callaghan, W. Va. Surface Mining Board,
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charges that would migrate offsite without treatment, the to-be permitted facility
will necessarily violate the hydrologic balance protection provisions of 38 CSR
§ 2-14.5 and the permit will not be issued.94 In 1994, DEP denied a permit to
McElroy Coal Company for the construction of a refuse pile because the refuse
95
pile was projected to cause AMD for decades, and perhaps even centuries.
This permit denial was upheld by the West Virginia Surface Mine Board, which
[DEP] to apply performance standards to
held that West Virginia law "requires
96
AMD."
avoid
to
order
in
operators
In 1999, CONSOL Energy submitted a permit application to DEP which
asked DEP to allow it to dispose of coal refuse in a new disposal facility, referred to as Cunningham Hollow, in Marshall County, West Virginia. 97 CONSOL's permit application predicted that without treatment, capping, or the use
of alternative treatment technologies, the Cunningham Hollow refuse area
would begin to discharge polluted water and continue to do so for an indefinite
period of time. 98 In 2001, DEP sent a letter to CONSOL informing CONSOL
that DEP "would not issue a permit that allowed the creation of acidic discharges which would require indefinite treatment at Cunningham Hollow and
advised CONSOL that DEP would require CONSOL to prevent the formation of
AMD by the use of an alkaline amendment." 99 "Subsequently, CONSOL
amended the probable hydrologic consequences statement, hydrologic reclamation plan, and other hydrologic portions of its permit application to provide for
addition of alkaline material to its refuse stream." 100 The addition of alkaline
material was designed to prevent pollution discharges from forming, not just to
treat those discharges after they formed.

App. No. 94-56-SMB (Feb. 11, 1995)); see also Consolidation Coal Co. v. Callaghan, W. Va.
Surface Mine Board, App. No. 02-20-SMB (Sept. 2002).
94

See McElroy Coal Co. v. Callaghan, W. Va. Surface Mining Bd., App. No. 94-56-SMB

(Feb. 11, 1995).

95

See id.

96

Id.

97

Consolidation Coal Co. v. Callaghan, W. Va. Surface Mine Board, App. No. 02-20-SMB

(Sept. 2002).
98
Id.
99

Id. "Alkaline amendment" is the addition of alkaline materials to an acidic pollutional

discharge.

OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ACID MINE DRAINAGE
PREVENTION AND MITIGATION TECHNIQUES, available at http://www.osmre.gov/amdpvm.htm.

The addition of alkaline materials to the acidic discharge tends to neutralize the discharge and can
cause certain metals to precipitate out of solution, thereby making the pollutional discharge less
pollutional. Id.
100
Consolidation Coal Co. v. Callaghan, W. Va. Surface Mine Board, App. No. 02-20-SMB
(Sept. 2002).
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In a September 2002 order reviewing this proposed permit, the West
Virginia Surface Mine Board noted that
[a]n applicant for a permit has the burden to affirmatively demonstrate that reclamation can be accomplished. Completion of
reclamation includes meeting effluent limits and water quality
standards and obtaining [final] bond release. To obtain final
bond release, the drainage from a site must meet effluent limits
without chemical treatment. Chemical treatment includes [both
active and] passive forms of chemical treatment. However,
'chemical treatment' does not include 'measures approved in
the permit and taken during mining and reclamation to prevent
the formation of acid mine drainage.' Where there is potential
for acid mine drainage, alkaline amendment may be one such
101
measure.
Thus, the Surface Mine Board found that if pollution discharges were prevented,
through alkaline amendment, the permit could be issued. However, if pollution
that permit
discharges requiring treatment are forecast in the permit application,
0
application, or permit revision, must normally be denied. a
B.

An Exception to the Rule: Allowing Permit and Bonding Revisions
When Long Term PollutionDischargesAre Forecast

While it is proper under the law for a regulatory authority to deny permits forecasting future post-mining pollution discharges that require ongoing
treatment, OSM has opened the door for a limited exception to practice. According to OSM, under certain circumstances, a regulatory authority can issue a
permit revision, though not an initial permit, to a mining permittee even when
mining under that permit revision is predicted to cause future pollution discharges.103 In a letter to DEP dated October 28, 1999, OSM indicated that if
DEP found that increases in already existing pollution discharges from a proposed CONSOL Shoemaker mine permit revision would not violate the hydrologic balance protection provisions of 38 CSR § 2-14.5 which require the prevention of material damage to the environment outside of the permit area, OSM
would not consider a decision by DEP to issue that permit revision to be arbi-

101 Id.(citations omitted).
102

See W. Va. Mining & Reclamation Ass'n v. Babbitt, 970 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. W. Va. 1997).

See Letter from Roger Calhoun, Director, Charleston Field Office, Office of Surface Mining, to Harold M. "Rocky" Parsons, Jr., Office of Mining and Reclamation, West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection (Oct. 28, 1999) (on file with author).
103
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trary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion. 104 In other words, if DEP thought it
was acceptable to issue that permit revision, so would OSM.
OSM's position with respect to the CONSOL mine is significant in that
it modifies OSM's previously stated policy which allowed permit revisions to be
issued only when the "discharge has a known endpoint and . . . the applicant
also posts adequate financial assurance to cover estimated treatment costs for
the life of the discharge. ' 1 5 The CONSOL operation did not predict an end
date to the treatment of pollution discharges, noting merely that "water pumping
and treatment would
commence and continue until no longer needed for water
106
purposes."
quality
In its letter to DEP dated October 28, 1999, OSM gave DEP six reasons
why it thought a decision by DEP to issue a permit revision to the Shoemaker
Mine, which contemplated increased pollution discharges from the level allowed
by then-permitted conditions, would be acceptable: (1) without the permit issuance, "there would still be pollutional discharge at the same location;" (2) with
the permit revision, there would be an increase of seventy-five gallons per minute in the amount of water to be treated; however, this increase would still be
"well within [CONSOL's] current proven ability to treat [water];" (3) the expected discharge point of future pollution discharges "has not been changed to a
location that might be sensitive to 'treated water;' (4) mine expansion under
the proposed permit would "not [be] expected to cause new locations of pollutional discharge points;" (5) the additional polluted water that would be discharged as a result of the permit revision would not require a change in treatment technologies already being used on site; and (6) CONSOL would have in
place an adequate financial mechanism to ensure the perpetual treatment of
AMD after mining of the site had been completed. 10 7 This last requirement
addresses the need for sufficient funds in West Virginia's SRF to pay for the
reclamation and perhaps perpetual water treatment costs of a site featuring pollution discharges when mining ceases.
CONSOL's financial assurance mechanism would not be adequate, at
least according to OSM, unless it provided enough money to ensure that all
costs of reclamation and treatment would be paid if the State of West Virginia
10 8
was required to take over the reclamation and treatment of the CONSOL site.
See id. In overseeing programs which have achieved primacy over the regulation of mining
within their borders, such as West Virginia, OSM will reverse a decision of the state organization,
here DEP, which implements that state's primacy program, only if OSM finds DEP's decision to
be "arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." 30 C.F.R. § 842.1 l(b)(2) (2004).
105
HYDROLOGIC BALANCE PROTECTION, supra note 79, at cmt. 13.
104

Letter from Gary E. Slagel, Director, Regulatory Affairs, CONSOL Energy, to Michael C.
Castle, Director, West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection (May 22, 2000) (on file with
author).
107 Letter from Roger Calhoun to Harold M. "Rocky" Parsons, Jr., supranote 103.
106

108 Id.
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Reclamation and treatment costs would include the acquisition of land and right
of ways, the construction of treatment facilities, and the operation of those facilities, 9including the payment of expenses associated with offsite sludge dis0
posal. 1
C.

Bonding on Permits Where a Post-MiningPollution Discharge Was Not
PredictedPriorto the Commencement of Mining

The problem of how to assure payment of post-mining treatment costs
raised by the situation at CONSOL's Shoemaker Mine is not simply confined to
that mine. While regulatory agencies normally do not issue permits which forecast the future, post-mining pollution discharges and the percentage of permits
resulting in post-mining pollution discharges have decreased in some states over
the years due to improvements in the permitting process. 110 Post-mining pollution discharges still occur in many instances when no such discharges were predicted prior to mining. Whenever discharges that violate legal discharge limits
appear during mining, those discharges must often be treated to meet legal water
quality limitations for many years, often even decades, following the completion
of mining. I1
A regulatory agency assures the mining entity's payment of these treatment costs through SMCRA and SCMRA bonding schemes in two ways.
1.

Adjusting Bonding Requirements Under SMCRA's Traditional
Bonding Scheme

In the past, the federal bonding system implementing the bonding
scheme of Section 509(a) of SMCRA had been criticized by federal officials for
not requiring appropriate reclamation bonds for sites featuring long-term pollution discharges.'
According to OSM's current Director, prior to recent actions
in Tennessee, 113 the federal system only required a bond large enough to pay for
one-time reclamation costs such as leveling highwalls, covering mined areas
with dirt, and hydroseeding the unreclaimed site in an effort to establish ground

109

Id.

110

See Shea, supra note 78, at 201.

ill

See, for example, Ingram v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 595 A.2d 733, 736-37 (Pa. Commw. Ct.

1991), where a mine discharged acid water for 12 years before the compliance order in question
and continued to discharge at the time of the decision.
112
See Brian Bowling, Agency Examines Its Bond System; Notice Seeks Input On How to Handle Mining System, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, May 17, 2002, at 7D, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Charleston Daily Mail File.
113
See infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text.
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cover on the site. 114 "When it comes to long-term problems such as [fixing]
'' 5
acid-mine drainage, the bond money runs out before the problem is fixed." "
OSM has recently responded to the problem of under-bonding on sites
featuring pollution discharges by relying on the provisions of Section 509(e) of
SMCRA to require increases in reclamation bond amounts. As provided for by
Section 509(e) of SMCRA, the amount of a reclamation bond "shall be adjusted
by the regulatory authority from time to time as affected land acreages are increased or decreased or where the cost of future reclamation changes."' 1 16 OSM
has stated that "if an unanticipated [water] treatment need arises, the regulatory
authority has an obligation to order an increase in the minimum [conventional]
bond required for [a mining] site" and that the minimum amount of the revised
conventional1bond for the site "must be adequate to cover all foreseeable treatment costs." 17
Since May 2000, OSM has attempted to implement in Tennessee its policy requiring bond adjustment. On May 30, 2000, OSM's Knoxville, Tennessee, Field Office issued "Field Office Policy Memorandum Number 37," a "Policy for Requiring Bond Adjustment on Permitted Sites Requiring Long-Term
Treatment of Pollutional Discharges."' 1 18 This policy requires a permittee to
adjust the amount of the SMCRA Section 509(a) reclamation bond to fully
cover the present and future costs of treating pollution discharges emanating
from the site.119
Field Office Policy Memorandum #37 provides that when there is unanticipated AMD, the permittee for that site is required to revise its permit to include an AMD treatment plan. 12 During the approval process for the AMD
treatment plan, Field Office Policy Memorandum #37 also requires the permittee to submit capital costs for replacement of the treatment system as well as
annual maintenance costs. 12 1 The cost information is then used by OSM to calculate an adjustment to the reclamation bond. 122 The Policy Memorandum provides that total costs for long term treatment (to be used in calculation of the
bond amount) is based on: (1) the present value of capital costs to replace the
114

See Bowling, supra note 112, at 7D.

115

Id.

116

30 U.S.C. § 1259(e) (2000).

117

West Virginia Regulatory Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 51,900, 51,902 (Oct. 5, 1995).

19
U. S. Dep't of the Interior, Office of Surface Mining, Knoxville Field Office, Field Office
Policy Memorandum No. 37, issued by George C. Miller, Director, Knoxville Field Office, May
30, 2000 (on file with author).
119

Id.

120

Id.

121

Id.

122

Id.
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facility, (2) the present value of annual maintenance and operation costs, (3) an
inflation factor, and (4) a seventy-five year performance period, or a shorter
time if the permittee can demonstrate that the AMD will be abated without
treatment in less than seventy-five years. 123 Once the costs for performing the
OSM adjusts the permittee's
treatment for seventy-five years are 1calculated,
24
costs.
those
cover
to
bond
reclamation
In accordance with Field Office Policy Memorandum #37, OSM's
Knoxville Field Office has issued several orders to mining operators requiring
them to adjust their bonds to cover the present and future water treatment costs
associated with the un-forecasted pollution discharges. These orders have required permittees to increase the amount of their bonds from the level of thousands of dollars to, in some cases, over a million dollars to meet the requirements of OSM's policy. For example, OSM's Knoxville Field Office required
Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company to increase its reclamation bond from
$186,000 to $9,060,800 to cover the future costs of treating pollution discharges
that OSM would have to bear if Tennesee Consolidated abandoned Daus Mountain Strip Mines #2 and #49.125
The various permittees to whom OSM's orders have been issued have
administratively challenged the orders and these challenges remain tied up in
court at the moment. The National Mining Association has also challenged
OSM's overall policy in a separate court proceeding, claiming, inter alia, that
the performance bonds required under OSM's Policy Memorandum, applicable
for a seventy-five year performance period, are essentially impossible for mine
126
operators to obtain.
The National Mining Association's challenge raises a prescient issue: a
permittee may have difficulty in increasing the amount of the reclamation bond
upon the advent of unpredicted pollution discharges. If the mining entity has
limited financial resources, it may have difficulty in posting a cash escrow or
other self insurance mechanism which would permit it to fulfill the regulatory
authority's increased bonding requirements. The mining entity may at the same
time be unable to convince a third party surety to issue it an increased reclamation bond, especially when the company has little or no collateral in which the
surety can take a security interest. OSM itself has recognized that the amount of
financial assurance needed to12 pay for treatment of post-mining pollution discharges "may be substantial."
123

Id.

124

Id. OSM's Policy Memorandum also provides that the permittee may use a sinking fund in
lieu of the bonding methods provided in the regulations to fund excess reclamation costs. Id.
125 U. S. Dep't of Interior, Office of Surface Mining Order Issued to Mr. Bernard Higgins,
Property Manager, Tennessee Consolidated Coal Company, June 22, 2000 (on file with author).
126 See Complaint filed in Nat'l Mining Ass'n v. Babbitt. - No. 00-0549, E. D. Tenn. District
Court, October 2, 2002 (on file with author).
127 HYDROLOGIC BALANCE PROTECTION, supra note 79, at cmt. 17.
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Another problem with requiring an increase in the amount of the reclamation bond upon the advent of pollution discharges is difficulty determining
with precision how long the pollution discharge will last and how long treatment
costs will have to be paid following the completion of mining. Not knowing
these two factors makes it difficult to assess how much the present day value of
the reclamation bond should be increased to assure that present and future
treatment and other reclamation costs will be paid.
A third problem relating to bond adjustments is that pollution discharges
from a mine may not even begin until several years after mining has been completed and regulatory jurisdiction over a site may have already terminated. For
example, in a May 22, 2000 letter to then-DEP Director Michael Castle,
CONSOL Coal Company projected that once its underground Shoemaker Mine
in northern West Virginia closed, the mine would flood and would produce
AMD as a result of this flooding. 128 However, CONSOL predicted that it would
take 106 years before this AMD discharged. 129 After the mine floods in 106
years, CONSOL promised that "water pumping and treatment would
commence
30
and continue until no longer needed for water quality purposes."
Fortunately, in the CONSOL case, future pollution discharges were predicted before bond release was granted. This has allowed financial assurance
mechanisms to be established, which will pay for the treatment of future pollution discharges emanating from the Shoemaker Mine. Unfortunately, the public
may not be so fortunate with respect to a coal company's payment of pollution
treatment costs at other mining sites. Without an Alternative Bonding System, a
trust fund, or some other alternative financial assurance mechanism previously
funded by coal permittees, the public may be forced to pay for unpredicted water treatment that begins at a mining site long after the mining entity and its
principals have disappeared.
2.

Assuring the Payment of Increased Reclamation Costs in an Alternative Bonding System

Adjustments in Alternative Bonding System contributions after increased reclamation costs are confirmed is also appropriate. An Alternative
Bonding System, must "provide for [the complete] abatement or treatment of
pollutional discharges emanating from permanent program bond forfeiture sites,
unless the approved program includes some other form of financial guarantee"
which will serve to fund all outstanding reclamation, including water reclamation liabilities. 13 1 If contributions made to an Alternative Bonding System are
128 Letter from Gary E. Slagel to Michael C. Castle, supra note 106.
129

Id.

130

Id.

131 Letter from W. Hord Tipton, Deputy Director, Operations and Technical Services, Office of
Surface Mining, to E.W. Wayland, Commissioner, West Virginia Division of Energy (Oct. 1,
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increased, these contributions will serve to fund the increased present and future
costs of reclamation associated with bond forfeiture sites featuring pollution
discharges. The Alternative Bonding System can pay for the complete abatement or treatment of pollution discharges in one of many different ways. For
example, if the Alternative Bonding System has a tax, the tax can be increased
to cover the additional projected costs associated with abating and treating pollution discharges from present and future forfeited bond sites. ' 32 If the Alterative Bonding System features some type of bonding requirement, "[t]he cost of
water treatment at future bond forfeiture sites may be addressed... by adjusting
site-specific bonds for water treatment where necessary, or by implementing
,,133
[an] environmental security account ....
West Virginia has not yet developed a formula to determine how much
a permittee's reclamation bond or contributions into its Alternative Bonding
System should be adjusted whenever an unplanned pollution discharge arises.
However, DEP has had experience in remediating and paying for the remediation of pollution discharges at unreclaimed mine sites through its Special Reclamation Program. West Virginia's first foray into paying for the remediation of
pollution discharges from mine sites occurred at the DLM site in Alton, Upshur
County, West Virginia. 134 In 1985, DLM Coal Company conveyed to West
Virginia all of its assets, including all of its mining interests, its real estate, and
its personal property (including mining equipment, machinery, cash, etc.) in
exchange for the State's promise to take over DLM's treatment of pollution discharges at its Alton site. 135 Since 1992, DEP has continued to treat pollution
discharges emanating from the Alton site. Annual expenditures on the site have
ranged from $177,239.93 on initial startup to $501,807.53 during the 1996-1997
fiscal year. 136 The total amount spent by DEP on the Alton site reclamation
since 1992 continues to increase; from 1992 when DEP starting treating water at

1991) (on file with author).
See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 51,900, 51,902 (Oct. 4, 1995).

132

133 Id. A West Virginia Regulation authorizes DEP to develop regulations which would require the creation of environmental security accounts. See W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 38-2-11(11.6)
(2004). DEP has never developed these regulations; however, the West Virginia Surface Mine
Board (including its predecessor the Reclamation Board of Review) has required the creation of
an environmental security account at three different operations throughout West Virginia. Letter
from Roger Calhoun, Director, Charleston Field Office, Office of Surface Mining, to Michael C.
Castle, Director, Division of Environmental Protection (September 3, 1999) (on file with author)
(containing an attachment describing these three environmental security accounts).
134

Interoffice Memorandum from Roger T. Hall to Dennis Boyles, supra note 5, at 12-13.

135

Id.

136

Information provided to author by Thomas McCarthy, Office of Special Reclamation, West

Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (on file with author).
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the Alton site until October 13, 2004, DEP spent $7,029,102.18
to treat pollu137

tional discharges coming from DLM's former permits.
Since DEP began treating pollution discharges from DLM's permits, it

has also begun treating pollution discharges from other sites. In the early 1990s,
DEP took over chemically treating AMD from the F&M Coal Company bond
forfeiture site in Preston County, West Virginia. 138 If left untreated, AMD from

this site would have endangered the Little Sandy Creek and the backwaters of
Tygart Lake. 139 At the time DEP took over treatment of the F&M site, the pH of
the pollution discharge, a measure of acidity, was 2.7.14 At the former T&T

and Omega sites, water treatment began in 1993 and 1994, respectively, and has
continued to this day. 14 1 Yearly reclamation and treatment costs at the DLM,

F&M, T&T, and Omega sites have run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars. 142

Between 1997 and 2001 alone, DEP spent $6,169,134.66 for water

143
treatment at those four sites.
Yet the cost of treating pollutional discharges from those four sites represent just a small fraction of the amount of money DEP has spent and that it
will have to spend to treat pollutional discharges at all of its forfeited mine sites

over many years. 144 On June 18, 2001, DEP related that it had 128 permits
requiring acid mine drainage (pollutional discharge) treatment. 145 DEP was able
to treat water on only 15 of those permits due to funding inadequacies in the

137

Id

138

Interoffice Memorandum from Roger T. Hall to Dennis Boyles, supra note 5, at 15-16.

139

Id

140

Preston Mine Owners FightState Order,CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Sept. 28, 1992 (on file

with author). The higher the pH, the lower the acidity of a sample. For example, water has a pH
of approximately 7.0. Vinegar, an acid, has a pH of approximately 3.0. Depending on the volume
of flow associated with a pH of 2.7, a pH of 2.7 could have dramatic, and devastating, effects on
the environment.
141
The T&T and Omega sites are located, respectively, in Preston County and Monongalia
County.
142
Annual Water Treatment Cost Data Maintained by the West Virginia Department of Enviromental Protection's Office of Special Reclamation for the years 1997-2001 (on file with author).
143

Id.

Special Reclamation Program statistics as of June 18, 2001 as maintained by the Office of
Special Reclamation for the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection. (on file with
author); Letter from Michael Castle, Director, West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection, to Allen Klein, Regional Director, U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Surface
Mining and Reclamation (Aug. 31, 2000) (on file with author).
145
Special Reclamation Program statistics as of June 18, 2001 as maintained by the Office of
14

Special Reclamation for the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection. (on file with
author).
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SRF. 146 If DEP had been able to fully treat water on all 128 permits at that time,
DEP's annual cost of water treatment would have equaled $5,764,256 and its
one time cost to construct permanent water treatment systems necessary for
those permits would have been $16,136,170. 147 Importantly, those figures did
not include the $25,002,134 DEP needed to perform "land only" reclamation on
its bond forfeited permits. 148 Yet even if the costs to perform "land only" reclamation were subtracted from DEP's 2001 reclamation responsibilities, the cost
sites in 2001
to DEP of performing only water reclamation on its bond forfeited149
time.
that
at
SRF
its
in
had
DEP
balance
$12,185,747
exceeded the
Permit and Bond Release When A PermittedArea Features Existing
Pollution Discharges

D.

Another issue that arises when continuing pollution discharges are present on a permit following the completion of mining is whether the permit and
reclamation bond for the site may be released given these continuing pollution
discharges. Section 519(c)(3) of SMCRA provides that no bond shall be fully
released until all the reclamation requirements of SMCRA have been fully
met. 150
Reclamation, which must be fully met before bond release may be
granted, "include[s] the abatement of surface and ground water pollution resulting from the operation." 15 1 OSM has stated that a reclamation bond may not be
released where active or passive treatment systems are being used to achieve
compliance with applicable effluent limitations.1 52 Federal court decisions have
adopted this position. 153 However, OSM has also established an exception to
this position by stating that "the regulatory authority may release the bond and
146
Id. Telephone interview with Charlie Miller, Special Reclamation Office, West Virginia
Department of Environmental Protection (Jan. 8, 2003).
Special Reclamation Program statistics as of June 18, 2001 as maintained by the Office of
147

Special Reclamation for the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection. (on file with
author).
148

Id.

149

Id.

150

30 U.S.C. § 1269(c) (2000).

151 Letter from W. Hord Tipton to E.W. Wayland, supra note 131; see also West Virginia
Regulatory Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 51,900, 51,902 (Oct. 4, 1995).

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 61 Fed. Reg. 6511, 6517 (Feb. 21, 1996). A wetland treatment system is one example of a passive water treatment system. See CHRISTINE STEIN152

KOENIG, OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR COALEX REPORT 111, available

at http://www.osmre.gov/coalex/coalexl l.htm (Nov. 1, 1999).
See Am. Mining Cong. v. U.S. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 768 (9th Cir. 1992); W. Va. Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n. v. Babbitt, 970 F. Supp. 506 (S.D. W. Va. 1997).
153
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terminate jurisdiction over a site with ongoing treatment needs ...if an enforceable mechanism such as a contract or a trust fund of sufficient duration and with

adequate resources exists to ensure that treatment continues once jurisdiction is
terminated."' 154 In referencing the contract and trust fund, OSM "clearly envisions that these [financial] assurances will result in continued treatment or im55
plementation of other remediation measures" after bond release has occurred.1

The general rule of West Virginia's SCMRA parallels the general rule
of SMCRA and prohibits bond release whenever existing pollution discharges
exist at the time bond release is sought. 156 SCMRA states that "no bond release
or reduction will be granted if, at the time, water discharged from or affected by

the operation requires chemical or passive treatment in order to comply with
applicable effluent limitations or water quality standards."' 157 Like SMCRA,
SCMRA also features an exception to this general rule, though under SCMRA, a

permit may only be eligible for partial (i.e. Phase I) bond release when pollution
discharges exist at the time that bond release is sought and the permittee has a
in place which will assure long term treatment of
financial assurance mechanism
58

acid mine drainage.1

VI. HISTORICAL INADEQUACIES IN WEST VIRGINIA'S BONDING PROGRAM

Over the past two decades, the issue of whether or how to permit and
bond pollution discharges has not been the only issue faced by West Virginia's
Alternative Bonding System. Indeed, the fundamental adequacy of West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System has been challenged. The issues of whether
West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System has been adequate under Section
509(c) of SMCRA and whether that system has achieved the objectives of the
traditional bonding program established by Section 509(a) of SMCRA are issues

154

West Virginia Regulatory Program, 60 Fed. Reg. at 51,902 (referring to 30 C.F.R. §

700.11 (d) (2003)).
HYDROLOGIC BALANCE PROTECTION, supranote 79, at cmt. 16.
155
156

See W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 38-2-12(12.2.e) (2004).

157

Id. In 1996, OSM required West Virginia to amend its SCMRA program to clarify that a

reclamation bond may not be released where passive treatment systems are used to achieve compliance with applicable effluent limitations. West Virginia Regulatory Program, 61 Fed. Reg.
6511, 6517 (February 21, 1996). West Virginia Code of State Rules section 38-2-12(12.2.e) is the
consequence of this required amendment. Section 38-2-12(12.2.e) clarifies what is and what is
not passive treatment by stating that "measures approved in the permit and taken during mining
and reclamation to prevent the formation of acid [mine] drainage shall not be considered passive
treatment." W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 38-2-12(12.2.e).
158 See id. There are three phases of bond release under SCMRA: Phases I, II, and III. See id.
The permittee becomes eligible for Phase I bond release first and may subsequently become eligible for Phase 11 and Phase IIIreleases depending on his adherence to SMCRA's performance
standards. See id.
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that have produced much administrative and legal wrangling over the past two
decades.
The primary problems with the adequacy of West Virginia's Alternative
Bonding System relate to the fact that West Virginia's bonding program has not
been adequately funded to pay for the treatment of unpredicted pollution discharges emanating from a mining site, and the program has been hobbled by
artificially imposed statutory restraints on receipts and expenditures.
Notwithstanding the removal of the conditions on West Virginia's alternative bonding and primacy programs in 1983, there were inherent problems in
the structure of West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System from the program's
very beginning. For example, under the statutes creating the Alternative Bonding System, West Virginia could spend unlimited amounts of money out of the
SRF for general administrative purposes or for non-coal programs. 159 In OSM's
opinion, DEP could have siphoned money off from the SRF to operate its other
regulatory programs. 16 Such a practice could have bankrupted the SRF." 6 In
response to this problem, in 1992 West Virginia placed an expenditure cap on
the SRF so. that
.. 162no more than 10% of the SRF could pay for DEP's administrative activities.
This change to West Virginia's program was approved by
OSM on October 4, 1995.163
Yet, the primary problem with the West Virginia bonding program over
the last twenty plus years has not been with the amount of expenditures that
have been authorized from the SRF but rather with the amount of contributions
the coal permittees have been required to make to the SRF. The two primary
contributions that permittees make to the SRF include a per ton• clean
coal
fee
•
.
164
operations.
mining
initiate
they
whenever
post
permitees
bond
acre
and a per
Each contribution has variously been too small in quantity over the past two
decades.
In the mid 1980s, West Virginia required a bond for each mining operation at a rate of $1,000 per acre (or fraction of an acre), with a minimum
$10,000 bond on the entire permit, as required by SMCRA. 165 Due to restrictions in the law, however, the balance in the SRF fluctuated between approximately one and two million dollars, collecting only a one cent per coal ton fee

159

See Interoffice Memorandum from Roger T. Hall to Dennis Boyles, supra note 5, at 10.

160

See id.

161

See id.

162

W. VA. CODE § 22A-3-1 I(g) (1993) (repealed in 1994 and recodified at W. VA. CODE § 22-

3-11 (g) (2004)).
163 See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 51,900, 51,903 (Oct. 4, 1995).
164

See W. VA. CODE § 22-3-1 1(a), (g) (2004).

165

See MERRITr, supra note 66.
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whenever the SRF's balance dropped below one million dollars. 166 In addition,
this fee was collected only until "the end of the quarter in which the [SRF was]
167
replenished to the two million dollar level."'
In the mid 1980s, the federal government's General Accounting Office
concluded that the reclamation bonds West Virginia was approving only paid 46
68
percent of the actual costs of reclamation following bond forfeiture. 1
"By 1988-89, [OSM] oversight evaluations indicated that [West Virginia's SRF] lacked sufficient revenue to reclaim all outstanding bond forfeiture
sites."' 169 One of the reasons for this problem was that West Virginia was assuming that it cost approximately $1,000 an acre-or the amount companies
posted in reclamation bonds-to clean up abandoned mines. 170 At the time, it
actually cost West Virginia approximately $2,000 an acre to reclaim an abandoned mine site. 171 Another reason for this funding problem was that the cash
balance in the SRF was too small because the SRF had stopped earning interest
due to investment losses suffered by the State's Consolidated Investment
Fund.172 In the early 1990s, OSM and DEP jointly determined that the liabili73
ties of the SRF exceeded the SRF's assets by at least $6.2 million.
In 1990, the West Virginia State Legislature began responding to these
problems in the SRF. 174 On March 10, 1990, House Bill 4735 went into effect,
175
raising the per ton coal tax from one cent to three cents.
During the 1991 legislative session, the West Virginia Legislature created West Virginia Code section 22A-3-1 1(a). 176 West Virginia Code section
166

See id

167

Id.

168

See L. Thomas Galloway & Thomas J. Fitzgerald, The Bonding Program Under the 1977

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act: Chaos in the Coalfields, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 675,
680 (1987).
169
West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 67,446, 67,446 (Dec. 28, 2001).
170

See Ken Ward, Jr., Greenbrier Mine Closure Highlights Cleanup Fund's Woes State

Doesn 't Have Reclamation Money, THE SUNDAY GAZETTE-MAIL (Charleston, W. Va), May 30,
1999, at 3A.
171 See id
172

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. at 67,446.

173

Letter from W. Hord Tipton to E.W. Wayland, supra note 131.

174

Letter from David C. Callaghan, Director, West Virginia Division of Environmental Protec-

tion, to James C. Blankenship, Jr., Director, Charleston Field Office, Office of Surface Mining,
Reclamation and Enforcement (May 8, 1995) (on file with author).
175 Id. House Bill 4735 was codified at West Virginia Code section 22A-3-11(g). W. VA.
CODE § 22A-3-1 l(g) (later repealed and recodified at W. Va. Code § 22-3- l(h)).
176 See W. VA. CODE § 22A-3-1 1(a) (1993) (repealed in 1994 and recodified at W. VA. CODE §

22-3-11 (a)).
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22A-3-11 (a) provided for the development of site-specific bonding regulations
and also raised the upper limit on per acre bonding from a maximum of one
acre.177
thousand dollars per acre to a maximum of five thousand dollars per
Yet, despite the enactment of West Virginia Code section 22A-3-1 l(a) and the
increased tax provided for by West Virginia Code section 22A-3-11 (g), West
Virginia's bonding program remained inadequate. On October 1, 1991, OSM
notified West Virginia, pursuant to 30 C.F.R. § 732.17(c) and (e), that West
Virginia must amend its primacy program because the SRF no longer met the
requirements of 30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e). 178 OSM threatened to take over West
Virginia's Special Reclamation Program if West Virginia did not amend its mining regulatory program in a fashion that would establish the financial adequacy
of the SRF.179 Additionally, OSM also requested that West Virginia perform an
System
actuarial study to assure that West Virginia's Alternative Bonding
18
would be sufficient to fund reclamation at future bond forfeited sites.
If OSM had taken over the West Virginia Special Reclamation Program
in 1991, several changes to the program would have occurred. First, state regulations and statutory provisions would have been replaced by federal provisions. 181 "Enforcement activities under a federal program would [have] utilize[d] federal civil penalty provisions and the federal procedures for administrative and judicial review."
If West Virginia retained control of the administration of its AML reclamation program while ceding control of its Special Reclamation Program to OSM, West Virginia would have lost as much as $25 million
per year in AML reclamation funds for the administration of its AML reclamation program. 183 Also, the State would have lost about $1.3 million annually in
permitting fees and civil penalties, and the cost to coal companies for new permits issued under the federal bonding program would have been about 4.5 times
the amount that coal companies were paying for permits under West Virginia's
regulatory program. 184 In addition, federal officials would have reviewed all the
mining permits that the State had issued for existing permits and it would have
taken twelve to eighteen months after the time of OSM's program takeover be177

Id.

178

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. at 67,446. When taking into account

money that the SRF would have to spend on treating pollution discharges emanating from bond
forfeited sites, this number was likely much larger.
179

See Reclamation Fund's Use Halted,CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, April 10, 1991, at 10A.

180

Letter from W. Hord Tipton to E.W. Wayland, supra note 131.

181 See Reclamation Fund's Use Halted,supra note 179, at 1OA.
182

Id.

183

See Daniel Bice, Officials Outline Drawbacks To Losing Mine Control, CHARLESTON DAILY

MAIL, Aug. 1, 1991, at 4A.
184

See id.
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.
.. 185
fore OSM would issue any new mining• permits.
Finally, each operator would
have had to purchase reclamation bonds that cost between $4,500 to $6,000 per
acre: a significant increase over the size of the bonds that the operators were
being required to purchase under West Virginia's law at the time.
In response to OSM's October 1, 1991 letter, the threatened federal
takeover of West Virginia's mining regulatory program, and subsequent legislative efforts by DEP, further changes were made to West Virginia's Alternative
Bonding System bonding program in 1992 and 1993. Specifically, the Legislature: (1) required DEP to develop a planning process and prioritization procedure to determine the most cost-effective way to complete reclamation of sites
whose bond had been forfeited, (2) required that interest generated by the SRF
be returned to the SRF, (3) provided that the SRF could spend up to twenty-five
percent of its annual income on the treatment of pollution discharges from bond
forfeited sites, (4) limited the amount of the SRF that DEP could use to pay for
administrative expenses to ten percent per annum, (5) raised the special reclamation tax from one cent to three cents per ton of clean coal mined, (6) provided
for the continuation of the special reclamation tax as long as the liabilities of the
SRF exceeded the SRF's assets, (7) adopted site specific bonding regulations
allowing for the use of incremental bonding and open acre bonding, (8) required
operators to post penal, not performance bonds, (8) commissioned the study of
the feasibility of an environmental security account for water quality, and (9)
required DEP to develop a report to be filed with 187
the Legislature detailing how
these legislative changes were to be implemented.
In response to OSM's mandate in 1991 requiring DEP to perform an actuarial study on the financial health of its SRF, DEP commissioned the financial
accounting firm of Deloitte and Touche to complete this task. 188 This report,
titled "Actuarial Study for West Virginia Special Reclamation Fund," was completed and issued to DEP in March 1993; the report concluded that while the
SRF had an "accrual deficit position as of June 30, 1992," the financial solvency
of the SRF would realize gradual improvement between 1992 and 1997.189 The
report also predicted that the SRF would remain solvent for at least ten years.190
There were, however, inherent problems in this actuarial study. The
study did not contemplate the SRF's "potential liability [from] specific cases
where environmental liability relating to water contamination, acid-mine drain185

See id.

186

See id.

187 See W. VA. CODE § 22A-3-1 l(g) (1993) (repealed 1994); see also Interoffice Memorandum
from Roger T. Hall to Dennis Boyles, supranote 5, at 14.
188 See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 67,446, 67,446 (Dec. 28, 2001).
189

DELOITrE AND ToucHE, ACTUARIAL STUDY FOR THE WEST VIRGINIA SRF 7-23 (1993) (on

file with author).
190

Id.
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age or other large liability claims could be assessed against the State" of West
Virginia. 19 1 The report did consider that DEP would spend money to treat water
at two sites then featuring pollution discharge problems (the F&M Coal and
DLM sites). However, it did not and could not project the money on water
treatment that DEP would have to spend to treat pollution discharges on other
sites and how those expenditures might affect the SRF.192 The report also did
not contemplate the financial effect that more than fifteen years of water treatment at the DLM and F&M sites might have upon the SRF.
What the actuarial report was able to do, however, was state with credibility that, as of June 30, 1992, the SRF featured a deficit of $14,039,462.193
While the report was hopeful that the SRF would eventually begin to receive a
positive net income, the report projected that this would not occur until at least
1994 and also predicted that the SRF could suffer annual net losses of up to
$4,575,000 between 1992 and 1997.194 One cause of the approximately $14
million deficit identified by Deloitte and Touche was that the total cost of reclamation in 1993 was averaging approximately $4,000 per acre while the
amount of a reclamation bond posted for that same acreage was between $2,000
and $3,000 per acre.1 95 Some sites surveyed by Deloitte and Touche featured
bonds of less than $1,000 per acre.1 96 While recognizing that a "lower bonding
amount supplemented by coal tax and other revenue does tend to provide economic opportunity for the smaller, less capitalized operator," Deloitte and
Touche recommended that DEP consider raising the bond amount to the SRF's
actual, current reclamation cost, or in the alternative, increase SRF funding from
other sources.197
Deloitte and Touche's report touched on a flaw that remained in the
West Virginia regulatory program following the changes made to West Virginia's SCMRA program during the 1992-93 Legislative sessions. While the
site specific bonding requirements passed by the Legislature in 1992-93 meant
that mines with larger potential pollution problems would have to post larger
bonds, site specific bonds were still capped at a rate of $5,000 per acre. Often,
the cost of reclaiming a site with environmental problems, such as pollution
191

Id.

192 Id. at 4.
93

194

Id. at 7.

Id. at 7-9.

195 Id. at 5. Another interesting fact that Deloitte and Touche's Report presented was that it
cost approximately $3,500 to reclaim a disturbed acre on a surface mining operation while it cost
twice this amount, approximately $7,000, to reclaim a disturbed acre on an underground mining
operation. Id. at 26.
196 Id. at 6.
197

Id. at 5.
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discharges, can be in the millions
of dollars, due to the perpetual nature of
1 98
treatment needed at those sites.
Up until the mid-1990's, DEP officials took the legal position that the
SRF did not have to be used to treat polluted water at abandoned mine sites with
bond forfeiture monies.199 The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals,
statutory provisions, and OSM took a contrary view. In 1994, the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals ruled that under the West Virginia Code, DEP "has a
mandatory, nondiscretionary duty to utilize monies from the SRF, up to twentyfive percent of the annual amount, to treat AMD at bond forfeiture sites when
the proceeds from forfeited bonds are less than the actual cost of reclamation. "' 2 0 This ruling, and subsequent adherence to it by DEP, served to help
clean up the environment, but also served to place additional strain on the
State's SRF. A report submitted to the Legislature by DEP in 1994 noted that of
the 700 sites that were then part of West Virginia's Special Reclamation Program, 98 of those sites featured acid discharges. 20 1 This report estimated that if
all of these discharges were required to meet state and federal water quality
standards, the cost of treatment would be $7.4 million initially and $4.7 million
annually. 20 2 "More significantly, the long term liability against the SRF would
grow geometrically to a maximum of $53 million after five
years." 20 3 The re20 4
port characterized such growth as "fiscally irresponsible."
Recognizing the deficit in the SRF identified by Deloitte and Touche in
its 1993 report and costs associated with future water treatment, DEP proposed
in 1994 to seek legislative approval of a five cent increase in the SRF's special
reclamation tax.20 5 At that time, DEP projected that raising the fee by this
amount would raise approximately $7 million for DEP's SRF. 20 6 After this fee
increase was proposed, West Virginia Coal Association President Bill Raney
198

An example of this can be found by analyzing DEP's treatment of the DLM Alton site.

DEP has spent over $3.8 million in treating this site since treatment began in 1992. This information was obtained from the Department of Environmental Protection's Office of Special Reclamation (on file with author).
99
See BOND FORFEITURE REPORT, supra note 9.
200

State ex. rel. W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. W. Va. Div. of Envtl. Prot., 447 S.E.2d 920,

925 (W. Va. 1994).
201 See BOND FORFEITURE REPORT, supra note 9, at v-vi.
202

Id.

203

Id.

204

id.

205

Letter from James Blankenship, Jr., Director, Charleston Field Office, Office of Surface

Mining, to David C. Callaghan, Director, West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection
(Aug. 30, 1994) (on file with author).
206
Id.
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vowed that the coal industry would oppose the tax increase.207 The Legislature
did not raise the per ton coal fee and no additional revenues were generated for
the SRF despite OSM's finding that the SRF had a deficit of at least $22.2 million in June, 1994.208
In 1995, OSM determined that the SRF had $62 million less than what it
needed to reclaim the mine sites then covered by the SRF program. 20 9 Along
with this finding, OSM again found that the West Virginia Alternative Bonding
System no longer met the requirements of federal law because "the amount of
West
bond and other guarantees under theS,,2
10 Virginia program are not sufficient to
Moreover, OSM
assure the completion of reclamation.
disapproved parts of DEP's proposed amendments to [West
Virginia's] alternative bonding system program. OSM ordered
West Virginia to submit a proposed [program] amendment...
[that would] (1) remove the twenty-five percent limitation on
expenditure of funds for water treatment or otherwise provide
for treatment of polluted water discharge from bond forfeiture
sites, (2) remove the state law provision that allows collection
of the special reclamation tax only when the special reclamation
fund's liabilities exceed its assets, and (3) eliminate the deficit
in the State's alternative bonding system and ensure sufficient
funds will be available to complete reclamation, including
treatment of polluted water, at all existing and future bond forl
feiture sites.Z2
all of OSM's required amendments until the 2001
West Virginia failed to enact
2 12
session.
legislative
special
Also in 1995, DEP and OSM formed a joint team to evaluate the SRF
and the issue of whether the SRF generated enough revenue to exceed its ac-

207

See Tax To Clean Up Streams Gets Support, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Aug. 5, 1994, at

6B.
208

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 60 FED. REG. 51,900, 51,910 (Oct. 4, 1995). This

$22.2 million deficit did not even contemplate the cost of treating water associated with bond
forfeiture sites. See id.
209
See Ward, supra note 170, at 3A.
210

West Virginia Regulatory Program, 60 Fed. Reg. at 51,910.

211

W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 137 F. Supp. 2d 687, 690 (S.D. W. Va 2001),

dismissed in part by 147 F. Supp. 2d 474 (S.D. W. Va. 2001), modified by 161 F. Supp. 2d 676
(S.D. W. Va.), modified by 190 F. Supp. 2d 859 (S.D. W. Va. 2002), modified by 238 F. Supp. 2d
761 (S.D. W. Va. 2003) (citations omitted).
212
See id. at 690-91; see also infra Part VILD.
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213

crued liabilities. 2 1 On December 6, 1995, DEP Director Laidley McCoy notified OSM that DEP was recommending that "appropriate legislation be developed to remove the current 5000 dollar per acre site-specific bond cap," and to
continue the collection of the special reclamation tax without regard to the current asset/liability ratio in the SRF. 214 During the 1995 West Virginia Legislative Session, DEP introduced legislation to implement the proposals referenced
2 16
by Director McCoy. 2 15 The Legislature passed neither of DEP's proposals.
In a 1997 report, OSM stated that "under current projections, the [SRF]
will not be sufficient to eliminate the backlog of unreclaimed forfeiture sites for
10 to 20 years without any consideration of other sites added for water treatment.''z 7 In 1998, the number of unreclaimed forfeiture sites grew even larger
as coal companies forfeited an additional sixty-four mine sites covering 2,176
218
acres.
While DEP cleaned up eleven abandoned coal mines, consisting of 371
acres of mined land, in 1999, the number of bond forfeiture sites continued to
grow and outpace the rate at which DEP was able to reclaim those sites. 2 19 In
1999, SCMRA permittees abandoned twenty-three more mine sites and added
871 acres of land to the number of acres that DEP was required by law to reclaim. 22 In 1999, there were 11,446 acres of mine sites that DEP needed to
reclaim. 22 1 To reclaim these sites, DEP needed an additional $62 million. 22 In
its 1999 report on the West Virginia Program, OSM noted that DEP was only
spending SRF money at five of the sixty-seven abandoned mine sites which
213 Letter from Michael Castle to Allen Klein, supra note 144.
214 Letter from Laidley Eli McCoy, Director, West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection, to James Blankenship, Director, Charleston Field Office, Office of Surface Mining (Dec. 6,

1995) (on file with author).
215 Letter from Mark A. Scott, Deputy Director, West Virginia Division of Environmental
Protection, to Mr. James C. Blankenship, Jr., Director, Charleston Field Office, Office of Surface
Mining, Reclamation and Enforcement (May 16, 1996) (on file with author).
216

Id.

2t7 See Ward, supranote 170, at 3A.
2i See id.
219 Ken Ward, Jr., West Virginia Mine Cleanup FundDeficit Growing, Too Many Studies of the
Problem, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, May 30, 2000, at IA, available at LEXIS, News Library,
The Charleston Gazette File.
220

See id.

See OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, ANNUAL EVALUATION
SUMMARY REPORT FOR THE REGULATORY AND ABANDONED MINE LANDS PROGRAMS
ADMINISTERED By THE STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA FOR EVALUATION YEAR 1999 A-7 tbl. 6 [hereinaf221

ter EVALUATION SUMMARY REPORT 1999], available at
westvirginia99.pdf.
222 See Ward, supra note 219, at IA.
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were producing pollution discharges, and the "WVDEP bonding system [in
place at this time] is inadequate to complete land reclamation and abate water
pollution."' 223 Even if no new abandoned mine sites were added in 1999 or after
to the list of sites which DEP would be required to reclaim, under the fiscal condition of the SRF in 1999, "the [SRF would] not be224sufficient to eliminate the
backlog of unreclaimed forfeiture sites for 20 years."
By 1999, OSM had been annually warning DEP for ten years that West
Virginia's SRF was under-funded. 225 In mid-1999, DEP completed the second
phase of the studies it had commissioned in 1995 to examine the financial solvency of West Virginia's SRF and Alternative Bonding System. The second
phase of the studies noted that: (1) DEP needed to begin water treatment at over
100 bond forfeited mining sites which featured untreated pollution discharges,
(2) the cost of treating pollution discharges on all bond forfeited mining sites
then existing would require a one time expenditure of $16 million and annual
expenditures of over $5 million, and (3)
West Virginia's current bonding system
22 6
was "inadequate to cover these costs."
The second phase of DEP and OSM's joint studies also offered some
hope because it found that the SRF could eventually become financially solvent
if the SRF was not required to pay for water treatment, the SRF's responsibilities were limited to land reclamation, and additional revenue sources were created to pay for untreated pollution discharges at bond forfeited sites. 2 2 7 Two
recommendations found in a December 11, 1998 draft of the study called for
DEP to maximize use of its Clean Water Act enforcement authority to mitigate
water treatment liabilities which were accruing to the SRF, and for DEP to develop a fund separate from the ordinary SRF, which could be used to fund water
treatment.228 According to this 1998 draft, this new bifurcated fund should feature "a funding method weighted toward the exposure
of the permitted operation
' 229
to potential long term water treatment liabilities.
April of 2000 saw DEP and the coal industry establish a bonding work
group whose objective was to "determine the scope and financial cost for longterm treatment of AMD and to develop options for financial assistance mecha223

ANNUAL EVALUATION SUMMARY REPORT 1999, supra note 221, at 7.

224

Id.

225

See id.

226

Letter from Glenda Owens, Acting Director, United States Department of the Interior, Of-

fice of Surface Mining Reclamation and Enforcement, to Michael 0. Callaghan, Secretary, West
Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (June 29, 2001) (on file with author).
227 WEST VIRGINIA ALTERNATIVE BONDING SYSTEM REVIEW, PHASE II REPORT OF THE BONDING
WORK TEAM l(June 1999) (on file with author) [hereinafter PHASE II REPORT]; see also West
Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 67,446, 67,449 (Dec. 28, 2001).
228 See id. (draft on file with author).
229

Id.
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nisms that provide the capability to fund long-term treatment costs." 230 This
group's efforts resulted in a contract between DEP and Marshall University to
23 1
develop ideas on how to fund long-term treatment costs.
According to OSM records, by the year 2000, DEP had paid an average
of nearly $3,000 to reclaim every acre of land reclaimed by its SRF. 232 DEP's
records show that the average cost of reclamation per acre in 1995 was
$3,208.96. 23 ' Between 1992 and 2000, the average bond posted for mines that
were abandoned was about $700.234
In July of 2000, a citizens group, the West Virginia Highlands Conservancy, and others, filed a formal "notice of intent" to sue OSM to make the federal agency take over DEP's reclamation bonding program via what is referred
to as a 30 CFR Part 733 action. In its notice of intent to sue, the Highlands Conservancy made the following allegations:
DEP... is neither maintaining nor enforcing the surface mining
program as Congress intended. Until now, we have been reluctant to bring an action against OSM to compel it to withdraw its
approval from the State program because we had hoped that the
DEP would be able to correct the deficiencies on its own. West
Virginia should be able to enforce and maintain its own program as other states do, and we hope that it will be able to do so
again soon ... Currently, however, DEP is not up to the job...
DEP, which does not have the ability to perform the serious
technical and economic analysis necessary to protect the State's
environment and communities, must not be allowed to retain its
authority to oversee and permit the elimination of West Virginia's irreplaceable streams and forests. [M]ost disturbing is
DEP's failure to address the deficiencies in its alternative bonding system and its failure to maintain adequate staffing levels.
By requiring inadequate bonds, DEP has grossly under-funded
its SRF, making it impossible to complete reclamation at all existing and future bond forfeiture sites. The failure to require
adequate bonding not only harms the environment, but will
eventually harm all West Virginia taxpayers when they are

230

Letter from Michael Castle to Allen Klein, supra note 144.

231

See infra Part VII.A.

232

See Ward, supra note 219, at IA.

233 Memorandum from Rich Casdorph, Program Manager II, West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection, to Pete Pitsenbarger, Chief, West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection (Apr. 11, 1996) (on file with author).
234
See Ward, supra note 219, at IA.
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reclamation that the law requires coal opforced to pay for the
2 35
perform.
to
erators
By not hiring adequate staff, the Conservancy alleged that DEP "has
created a situation where, in OSM's words, "employees are overwhelmed with
daily regulatory
duties
S.
.
, ~,236and do not have sufficient time for activities to prevent or
minimize problems.
The Conservancy also stated that under federal rules,
OSM was required to either take over the West Virginia mining regulatory program or hold a public hearing
in the State "to remedy the undisputed deficien237
cies in the State program."
After the Conservancy filed its notice of intent to sue in July of 2000,
DEP informed OSM in August 2000 that DEP intended to propose a solution to
the inadequate Alternative Bonding System that would: (1) bifurcate the State's
existing Alternative Bonding System into land reclamation and water treatment,
(2) use an outside contractor to complete a feasibility study on funding options
with a draft report due in November of 2000, and (3) present a final report with
suggested permanent changes to the State's Alternative Bonding System in early
January8 2001 so that the issue could be taken up during the 2001 legislative ses23
sion.
In his August 2000 letter, DEP Director Castle indicated that "[c]reating
a water treatment bonding component [in the SRF] addresses bond forfeitures
and existing permits with AMD issues while providing
a funding mechanism to
239
insure comprehensive treatment for the long term."
According to Castle, DEP needed to perform further studies to deter240
mine how this additional funding for AMD treatment would be provided.
"We are currently in discussions with Marshall University about conducting a
feasibility study relative to the conceptual plans under development," Castle told
OSM.24 1 "This study should allow us to test the veracity and fiscal soundness of
any solutions proposed by this concept." 242 OSM previously ordered DEP to
235 Ken Ward, Jr., Citizens Group Threatens Suit for Feds to Take Over DEP, THE SUNDAY
GAZETTE-MAIL (Charleston, W. Va.), July 16, 2000, at 2B.
236

Id.

237

Id.

238 Letter from Allen Klein, Regional Director, Office of Surface Mining, to Michael Castle,
Director, West Virginia Division of Environmental Protection (Sept. 29, 2000) (on file with author).

239 Letter from Michael Castle to Allen Klien, supra note 144.
240 See Ken Ward, DEP s Answer to Mine Cleanup, More Studies Funding Optionsfor Recla-

mation to be Examined, Short on Money, THE SUNDAY
241

Id.

242

Id.
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come up with a concrete plan to make the SRF solvent by December 1995.243
DEP had not completed
that task by OSM's deadline, and OSM had not forced
244
the State to act.
In response to DEP's August 2000 letter from Director Castle, OSM responded in a letter dated September 29, 2000, from OSM Regional Director Al
Klein. Klein gave West Virginia until thirty days after the end of the 2001 legislative session to submit its plan to OSM on how DEP would fix its Alternative
Bonding System. 245 Klein described this time frame as West Virginia's "final
opportunity" to correct its bonding program before formal federal intervention.246 Klein's letter also expressed to DEP that OSM felt "the bonding/water
quality problem is one of the most serious issues confronting West Virginia,"
and that there were "serious deficiencies
with the State's alternative bonding
24 7
system that must be resolved."

Not satisfied with OSM's and DEP's actions, in November of 2000, the
West Virginia Highlands Conservancy filed a lawsuit against OSM and DEP in
a bid to force OSM to take action against DEP to remedy DEP's inadequate
bonding program. 248 The Conservancy cited the Quintain Development site as
proof that the State's mine cleanup program was a mess. 249 The Conservancy
stated that, "[a]lthough the disturbed area on Quintain Development permit was
250
only about 200 acres, it will cost nearly four million dollars to reclaim it."
The Conservancy asked for a court order to force OSM to take over regulation
of the West Virginia coal mining industry from DEP. 1 The Conservancy also
asked for a court order to252
block any new permits from being issued without adequate reclamation bonds.
One of the main problems identified by the Conservancy in its suit was
that "DEP's special reclamation fund does not have sufficient funds to address
the potential risks and consequences of abandoned, unreclaimed or potential
future coal waste impoundment failures in West Virginia.' 2 53 The lawsuit noted
243

See id.

244

See id.

245

Letter from Allen Klein to Michael Castle, supranote 238.

246

Id.

247

Id.

248

See Ken Ward, Jr., Lawsuit Alleges Serious Flaws in Mine Bonds, THE SUNDAY GAZETrE-

MAIL (Charleston, W. Va.), Nov. 19, 2000, at 2B.
249

See id.

250

Id.

251

See id.

252 See id.
253

Id.
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that the United States Mine Safety and Health Administration found that there
are thirty-two coal waste dams in West Virginia that have a moderate or a high
potential to collapse into underground mines. 254 The Conservancy stated
Coal waste impoundment failure . . . are bonded in West Virginia under the State's alternative bonding system. Because the
alternative bonding system is insolvent, much of the costs of
cleanup for the significant environmental degradation caused by
such spills will be externalized so that taxpayers and users of
the waters will be forced to bear the costs of cleanup. This
shifting of costs of cleanup from coal operators to water users
and state taxpayers is contrary to Congress' clear intent that operators post bonds adequate
to assure complete reclamation in
25 5
the event of forfeiture.
In its complaint, the Conservancy also cited Arch Coal Inc.'s proposed
expansion of its Hobet Mining Inc. subsidiary's Dal-Tex mountaintop removal
mine near Blair, Logan County to illustrate what it perceived to be the problem
in West Virginia's SRF. 25 6 Specifically, the lawsuit claimed:
If Hobet were to default on its bond during Phase 7 of its operations at the Spruce Mine, it would cost more than fifty million
dollars to reclaim the mine to its proposed post-mining land use.
This would be the minimum cost for land reclamation alone,
exclusive of potential water treatment liabilities. Under the
State's alternative bonding system, the maximum bond for 257
the
Spruce Mine would be approximately sixteen million dollars.
The Conservancy lawsuit continued on with its allegations, stating that
although these requirements will increase the cost of reclamation, DEP has not adjusted its guidelines for the special reclamation fund to account for this increase. Despite the insolvency
of the West Virginia alternative bonding system, the DEP continues to issue permits like
the permit for Hobet's Spruce Mine,
258
pursuant to that system.

254

See id.

255

Id.

256

See id.

257

Id.

258

Id.
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As part of its lawsuit, the Highlands Conservancy requested that the court assume that all mining sites might need to be forfeited and requested that the court
only allow OSM to approve an Alternative Bonding System for West Virginia
which would fiscally be capable of paying for reclamation at all of those
sites.259
On April 18, 2001, DEP requested additional time to develop and obtain
approval of statutory and regulatory changes to the State's bonding provisions. 26 In addition, DEP requested that OSM conduct an informal review of a
report entitled
"The Mountain State Clean Water Trust Fund" (i.e. the "Hicks
261
Plan").
In response to the Highlands Conservancy suit filed in November of
2000, Chief U.S. District Judge Charles H. Haden, II for the Southern District of
West Virginia ruled on April 5, 2001, that the West Virginia Alternative Bonding System was superceded by the federal bonding program as the West Virginia Alternative Bonding System was less rigorous than and inconsistent with
the federal bonding program. 262 The State Alternative Bonding System was
inconsistent with the federal program because it "no longer [met] the objectives
and purposes of the conventional bonding program set forth in [Section 1259] of
SMCRA.''263 Judge Haden did not order DEP to immediately change its bonding system. But he did rule that, as a matter of law, West Virginia's Alternative
Bonding System was so flawed
that the tougher federal program automatically
264
Virginia.
West
in
effect
took
As DEP had been named as a defendant in the Highlands Conservancy's
lawsuit, this April ruling by Judge Haden would have forced DEP to implement
the federal bonding provisions found in Section 509(a) of SMCRA had it not
been for the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' subsequent April 24, 2001, opinion in Bragg v. West Virginia Coal Ass'n.265 In the Bragg opinion, the Fourth
Circuit ruled that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over state defendants in
the type of citizen suit that was brought under SMCRA by the Highlands Con2s9

See W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 238 F. Supp. 2d 761, 763 (S.D. W. Va.

2003).
260 See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 67,446, 67,446 (Dec. 28, 2001). For a
discussion of the "Hicks Plan," see infra Part VILA.
261

See infra Part VILA.

262

See W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 137 F. Supp. 2d 687, 694 (S.D. W. Va.

2001), dismissed in part by 147 F. Supp. 2d 474 (S.D. W. Va. 2001), modified by 161 F. Supp. 2d
676 (S.D. W. Va. 2001), modifiedby 190 F. Supp. 2d 859 (S.D. W. Va. 2002), modifiedby 238 F.
Supp. 2d 761 (S. D. W. Va. 2003).
263 Id. (quoting West Virginia Regulatory Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 51,900, 51,910 (Oct. 4,

1995)).
264

See id.

265

248 F.3d 275, 300 (4th Cir. 2001).
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servancy against DEP in Bragg.266 Judge Haden interpreted the Fourth Circuit's
ruling in Bragg to preclude his jurisdiction over DEP in the Highlands Conservancy's bonding suit, and in May 2001 he dismissed DEP as a defendant from
the bonding suit. 26 7 Thus, while he had ruled that DEP's bonding program was
inadequate, Judge Haden ended up not being able to force DEP to implement
Section 509(a) of SMCRA bonding. DEP did not implement Section 509(a)
bonding and the inadequacies in West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System
and DEP's SRF continued.
DEP Director Michael Callaghan's statements concerning the adequacy
of reclamation bonds followed a finding that Judge Haden had made five years
earlier in Cat Run Coal Co. v. Babbitt.268 In that case, Haden had noted that
because the amount of a mining reclamation bond is artificially capped at
$5,000 per acre, with the limited exception provided for in West Virginia Code
section 22-3-1 l(a), a reclamation bond by itself is often inadequate to cover2 69the
full cost of reclaiming an abandoned or orphaned West Virginia mining site.
As alluded to by Callaghan and by Judge Haden, numerous examples of
how a reclamation bond by itself is often inadequate to pay for the full cost of
mining reclamation are found throughout the history of West Virginia's mining
regulatory program. Some examples of inadequate reclamation bonds are found
by analyzing the Quintain Development, Amigo Smokeless, Bickford Mining,
Green Mountain Energy, Inc., Falcon, and Upper Big Branch mining sites.
In August 1997, DEP issued Quintain Development a mountaintop removal surface mining permit. 27 In January 2000, DEP revoked the company's
permit, forfeited Quintain's posted reclamation bond, and then collected that
bond. 27 1 Because of reclamation bond amount limitations imposed by statute,
Quintain had posted a reclamation bond for the site in the amount of only $1
million.272 It will likely cost DEP nearly $4 million to fully reclaim the Quintain site. 273 DEP's SRF must pay for the $3 million dollar difference between
the reclamation bond amount and the cost of full site reclamation.

266

See id. at 297-98.

267

See W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 147 F. Supp. 2d 474, 481 (S.D. W. Va.

2001), modified by 161 F. Supp. 2d 676 (S.D. W. Va. 2001), modified at 190 F. Supp. 2d 859
(S.D. W. Va. 2002), modified by 238 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. W. Va. 2003).
268
932 F. Supp. 772, 772 (S.D. W. Va. 1996).
269

Id. at 775 n.7.

270

See Ward, supra note 235, at 2B.

271

See id.

272

See id.

273

See id.
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DEP issued permit number 0-161-83 to Amigo Smokeless Coal Company on November 28, 1983.274 On November 15, 1996, DEP revoked this
permit.275 It has cost DEP over $1.9 million to reclaim this Raleigh County
Smokeless only posted a reclamation bond in the amount
mining site. 276 Amigo 277
of $170,000 with DEP.
Paul Kizer's Bickford Mining underground mining operation in Raleigh
County only posted a $10,000 bond whenever it obtained its permit to disturb
seventeen surface acres in conjunction with its underground mining operations
on West Virginia SCMRA permit U007885. 2 7 8 Now, it is costing DEP, and its
Special Reclamation Program, over $54,000 to reclaim the site. 279 Another Paul
Kizer company, Green Mountain Energy, posted a $16,000 bond for the nine
acres that its underground mine disturbed during mining. 28 The amount of
money it is costing DEP to reclaim this site is $54,635.281
The DEP issued Independence Coal Company two different mining
permits in 2001: a permit for its Falcon mine site near Van in Boone County,
West Virginia, and a permit for its Upper Big Branch Site near Twilight in
Boone County. 282 Independence posted a $2.1 million, or $3,700 per acre, bond
for its Falcon mine site and posted a $3.7 million, or $5,000 per acre reclamation bond (the maximum amount of bond required by statute), for its Twilight
operation. 2 83 Despite the posting of these large bonds, DEP Secretary Michael
Callaghan stated that it would probably cost much more than the amount of the
event Independence abandoned these
bonds posted to reclaim these sites in the 284
sites and DEP was forced to reclaim them.
274

Information obtained from West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection's Envi-

ronmental Resource Information System.
275

Id.

276

Affidavit of Charles Miller, Adventure Resources, Inc., U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the

Southern District of West Virginia, Case No. 92-50482, Adversary Proceeding No. 99-0046.
West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection's Environmental Resource Informa-

277

tion System.
278

Id.

279

Affidavit of Charles Miller, Adventure Resources, Inc., U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the

Southern District of West Virginia, Case No. 92-50482, Adversary Proceeding No. 99-0046.
280

West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection's Environmental Resource Informa-

tion System.
Affidavit of Charles Miller, Adventure Resources, Inc., U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
281

Southern District of West Virginia, Case No. 92-50482, Adversary Proceeding No. 99-0046.
Ken Ward, Jr., Mountaintop Removal Mine Issue Heads for Showdown, Even DEP Boss
Expects Court to Reject Permitsfor Massey, THE SUNDAY GAZE1TE-MAIL, May 13, 2001, at IA.
282

283

Id.

284

Id.
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Although Judge Haden did not grant the Highlands Conservancy a preliminary injunction following his May 29, 2001 hearing in the case, OSM, recognizing the overall inadequacy of West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System, proceeded with its attempt to correct West Virginia's Alternative Bonding
System. On June 29, 2001, OSM initiated actions under 30 C.F.R. § 733.12(b)
to take over West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System. 285 In its June 29,
2001, Part 733 notification, OSM notified West Virginia that to avoid having
OSM take over the State bonding regulatory program, DEP would have to initiate certain remedial measures by July 27, 2001. 286 These remedial measures
were designed to address the problems in West Virginia's bonding program,
identified by OSM at 30 C.F.R. § 948.16 (kkk), (jjj), and (111). 2 11 OSM also
required DEP to submit, by no later than 45 days after the end of the 2002 regular session of the West Virginia Legislature, fully enacted and adopted statutory
and regulatory revisions to remedy the deficiencies in West Virginia's bonding
program pursuant to 30 C.F.R. § 948.16 (kkk), (jjj), and (111). 288 As stated in its
Part 733 notice, OSM told DEP that if DEP failed to take corrective action, it
would recommend to the Secretary of the Interior that the Secretary partially
of the State program and implement a partial Federal regulawithdraw approval
2 89
program.
tory
Not satisfied with OSM's initiation of a Part 733 action against DEP in
June, the Highlands Conservancy continued its case against OSM. OSM moved
to dismiss the case against it in July 2001, given OSM's initiation of Part 733
proceedings; however, in an August 31, 2001, ruling and opinion, Judge Haden
denied that motion. 29 In his opinion, Haden said that "[s]ince at least 1991...
OSM has known officially that the West Virginia reclamation bonding program
failed (and today continues
to fail) to satisfy the federal statutory requirement
291
for adequate funding."
[In 19951 OSM reported... that on 'October 1, 1991 ...OSM
notified West Virginia in accordance with 30 C.F.R. § 732.17
that its regulatory program no longer met all Federal requirements.'
The federal agency's annual reviews since 1989
285

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 67,446, 67,446 (Dec. 28, 2001).

286

See id.at 67,446-47.

287 See id.
288

See id.

289

See id.

290

See W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 161 F. Supp. 2d 676, 679-80 (S.D. W. Va.

2001), modified by 190 F. Supp. 2d 859 (S.D. W. Va. 2002), modified by 238 F. Supp. 2d 761
(S.D. W. Va. 2003).
291 Id. at 679.
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showed the State alternative bonding system's liabilities exceeded [its] assets, and by 1994, the deficit was twenty-two million dollars .... While approving the proposed increases in the
West Virginia site specific bond cap and the per-ton tax rate,
OSM found these increases 'still insufficient to ensure complete
reclamation, including treatment of polluted water.' OSM concluded ... that West Virginia's alternative bonding system no
longer meets the requirements of 30 C.F.R. § 800.11(e). Furthermore, it is not achieving the objectives and purposes of the
conventional bonding program set forth in section 509 of
SMCRA since the amount of bond and other guarantees under
are not sufficient to assure the comthe West Virginia program
29 2
pletion of reclamation.
Haden continued on to note that the SRF's decade-long inadequacy has
resulted in "unreclaimed mine sites, polluted state streams, and 'an immense
293
the taxpayers.'
state liability, incurred by the mine operators, but borne by
While Haden noted that OSM had taken a step towards remedying the decade
long inadequacies in West Virginia's bonding program, Haden described this
step as "tentative" and noted that the injury to the plaintiff Highlands Conservancy would continue until
(1) West Virginia implements a state reclamation bonding system sufficient to satisfy SMCRA §§ 1259(a) and 30 C.F.R. §
800.11, or (2) OSM Director Owens substitutes federal enforcement, or (3) Secretary Norton withdraws approval of the
federal enforceState program in whole or part and substitutes
294
program.
federal
a
promulgates
or
ment
Haden noted that OSM Director Owens began remedying the inadequacies in
733 letter.29 5
West Virginia's bonding program in June 2001 by issuing the Part
However, it was apparent that "the conclusion of the process, a remedy for
' 296
While Haden
Plaintiff's alleged wrong, lies somewhere in the distant future."
denied the Highland Conservancy's motion for a preliminary injunction against
OSM because he found that the compliance deadlines set forth in OSM's Part

292 Id. at 679-80 (quoting W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 147 F. Supp. 2d 474, 479
(S.D. W. Va. 2001) (citations omitted).
293 Id. at 680.
294

Id.

295

Id.

296

Id.
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733 notification were reasonable, 297 Haden did not dismiss OSM from the Conservancy's lawsuit and pressure remained on OSM to fix West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System through a takeover of West Virginia's reclamation bonding program.
VII. RECENT ATTEMPTS TO MODIFY WEST VIRGINIA'S ALTERNATIVE

BONDING SYSTEM

In response to a call to action and threatened takeover of its program by
OSM, a huge accumulated operating deficit in its SRF by the latter part of 2001,
and judicial action by the federal district court for the Southern District of West
Virginia, DEP decided to initiate legislative action in late 2001 to correct deficiencies in its Alternative Bonding System.298 Before deciding on a final legislative proposal, DEP analyzed three approaches to fixing its Alternative Bonding System.
A.

The Hicks Plan

On September 6, 2000, DEP and the Center for Business and Economic
Research at Marshall University entered into a Memorandum of Understanding
that called for the development of a new bonding system under SCMRA to
serve as an alternative to that system which was maintained by the State of West
Virginia, in one form or another, during most of the 20'b century. This Memorandum of Understanding called for Marshall to develop a multi-tiered bonding
system "that will ensure the availability of the financial resources necessary to
mitigate any negative impacts of coal mining activity on the quality of West
Virginia's groundwater."' 299 The product of this Memorandum of Understanding, what is commonly referred to as the "Hicks Plan" or the "Mountain State
Clean Water Trust Fund," was published in final draft form in May 2001 and
creates a water treatment fund that can treat the current and estimated pollution
297

Id at 684-85.

298

According to Judge Haden in West Virginia Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, the High-

lands Conservancy's citizen suit
has jump-started long overdue state and federal agency action. Part 733 proceedings were begun [by OSM] only after the Conservancy moved the Court to order
them begun. The State [of West Virginia] quickly responded with a plan and a
special legislative session. This citizen suit already has prompted important results:
both a date certain for OSM's final decision on the 7-Up Plan and the agency's
promise, in the event of disapproval, to take Part 733 action immediately.
W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 190 F. Supp. 2d 859 (S.D.W.Va. 2002), modified by
238 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. W. Va. 2003).
299 Memorandum of Understanding Between WV Division of Environmental Protection and
Center for Business and Economic Research (CBER), Lewis College of Business, Marshall University (Sept. 6, 2000) (on file with author).
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discharges from mining operations into perpetuity. 300 The Hicks Plan is designed to prevent more coal firm defaults and at the same time "self-insure
against the potential failure of coal mining firms, pay for [the Plan's] administrative costs, and sunset itself as early as possible."30 1 Specific goals of the
Hicks Plan include: (1) removing the liability for treating mine related environmental damage to West Virginia's natural waterways from the SRF; (2) preserving incentives for firms to avoid environmental damage and invest in better
abatement/treatment technologies; (3) establishing a fund sunset date of 2025,
featuring a fully capitalized fund that generates interest payments to cover projected clean up costs;
and (4) maintaining realistic but conservative assumptions
3 2
0
forecasting.
for all
The Hicks Plan notes that West Virginia's SRF is not currently adequate
30 3
to treat both AMD and to perform land reclamation of defaulted mine sites.
In response to this problem, the Hicks Plan bifurcates West Virginia's SRF into
two components: land and water. 3 0 4 The Hicks Plan concentrates primarily on
finding ways to treat water because, as the report's authors state, the SRF is
"without question, adequate to treat all deferred and forecasted land [reclamation needs]
if water treatment demands are placed upon another funding
, 30 5
source."
West Virginia's traditional Alternative Bonding System spreads the responsibility for paying for defaulted firms' water treatment among all coal operators, not just those who are discharging bad water from their sites. In addition, West Virginia's traditional Alternative Bonding System operates somewhat
like the Social Security System. While the SRF promises to pay for land and
water reclamation at all sites which contribute to the SRF, the monies which are
contributed into the SRF today are not left to rest in a bank account so that they
may be used twenty years down the road from now. Instead, those funds are
spent today to reclaim sites that require current reclamation. Taking West Virginia's current Alternative Bonding System to its logical conclusion, and assuming perpetual water treatment, the last coal company standing in West Virginia
would theoretically bear the burden of paying for ongoing water treatment at all
of the sites that have been previously forfeited and which are still producing bad
water at the time that coal company is operating. Some coal operators, such as
A.T. Massey, have been critical of West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System
300

MICHAEL J. HICKS ET AL., THE MOUNTAIN STATE CLEAN WATER TRUST FUND, A REPORT TO
THE WEST VIRGNIA DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION (May 2001), available at

http://www.marshall.edu/cber/Research/MayDraft.pdf.
301

Id.

302

Id. at 1.

303

Id. at 17.

304

Id.

305

Id. at 20.
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because through the imposition of the per ton coal fee, they end up paying for
reclamation, including water treatment, that should be the responsibility of other
coal companies. 3 06 DEP has admitted that West Virginia's current Alternative
Bonding System is not fair30in7 the way that it makes existing companies pay for
past companies' misdeeds.
The Hicks Plan attempts to address these fairness concerns as it does not
spread the responsibility for water treatment at projected abandoned mine sites
among all coal operators as evenly as West Virginia's traditional Alternative
Bonding System. When compared with West Virginia's traditional Alternative
Bonding System, the Hicks Plan requires larger payments from permittees who
are actually treating water; it requires smaller payments from those permittees
not treating water. The Hicks Plan is more economical than West Virginia's
current Alternative Bonding System for those permittees who are not and who
will not be treating pollutional discharges from their sites.
Another benefit of the Hicks Plan is that, unlike funds contributed to
West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System, funds contributed to the Hicks
Plan Trust Fund today cannot all be spent as they are collected. 308 Instead,
some of these contributions are saved for expenditures that may need to occur
well into the future. 30 9 It appears that the savings provision of the Hicks Plan is
designed to ensure the long-term viability of DEP's SRF.
The Hicks Plan has two time components: the initial funding phase and
the perpetuity phase. 31 The Hicks Plan assesses the operator currently treating
water with five different assessments. 3 1 These assessments include a cash
matched dedicated portfolio, a risk insurance annuity, a sunset annuity, an administrative annuity, and a water treatment fee. 312 Operators not currently treating water only have to pay one assessment into the fund: the 3.6 cent per ton of
clean coal water treatment fee. 3 13 The operation of the Hicks Plan can best be
understood by utilizing hypotheticals.

306

See Brian Bowling, Massey Opposes Mine Bond Deal, Company Has Sent Letters to Law-

makers to Fight Proposal,CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Sept. 6, 2001, at 2C.

307 See id.
308

HIcKS, supra note 300, at 21.

309 Id.
310

Id. at 12.

311 Id.
312

Id.

313 Id.
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Assessments Against Companies Not Currently Treating Water

Under the Hicks Plan, a coal mining company not currently treating wain West
ter must payr 3.6 cents to the State for every ton of clean coal it 3produces
15
This fee is referred to as the Water Treatment Fee.
Virginia.
The Water Treatment Fee operates similarly to the per ton of coal fee
imposed under West Virginia's traditional Alternative Bonding System by West
Virginia Code section 22-3-11(h). 3 16 If a coal company produced 1.2 million
tons of coal per year, but was not required to treat water at its site to meet effluent requirements, under the 3.6 cent per ton coal tax imposed under the Hicks
Plan, that company would have to pay the State only $43,200 per year.
According to the Hicks Plan, a fee of 3.6 cents would generate $5.14
million annually, which could be used to pay for the backlog of water reclamation needs. 317 Based on worst case production figures, as provided by the Energy Information Administration, the Hicks Plan forecasts that its 3.6 cent per
ton tax would generate enough money to pay off all 318
outstanding treatment costs
forfeitures.
bond
past
of
result
a
as
accrued
has
DEP
Unfortunately, the figures used by the Hicks Report may overestimate
the amount of revenue that would be produced by a 3.6 cent per ton of coal fee.
Using figures of Year 2002 Coal Production in West Virginia, a 3.6 cent per ton
fee would only have produced $5.10 million in revenues during 2002, not the
$5.14 million forecasted by the Hicks Report. 3 19 While this small difference
may seem insignificant on a one year basis, the Hicks Plan calls for the 3.6 cent
fee to be collected for 24 years.
If only a 3.6 cent fee were collected over a
23 year period, and coal revenues from this tax remained at their current levels,
the Trust Fund would realize approximately $920,000 less in revenue than that
amount of revenue projected by the Hicks Plan. This discrepancy would be
even larger if annual revenues from the per ton coal fee sank below year 2002
levels. Depending on future actual reclamation costs, if this fee of the Hicks
Plan were implemented, it might need to be revised. Fortunately, this eventuality was foreseen through the Hicks Plan's creation of a Trust Fund management
team and a structured forecasting research effort which would monitor any defi314

Id. at 14.

315

Id.

316

W. VA. CODE § 22-3-11(h) (2004).

317

HICKS, supranote 300, at 16.

318 Id.
319

See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RECLAMATION FUND ADVISORY COUNCIL TO THE WEST

VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE 2 tbl. 1 (Jan. 2, 2003) (on file with author) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE

SPECIAL RECLAMATION FUND ADVISORY COUNCIL 2003]. This report was authored in part by Dr.
Hicks.
320 HICKS, supra note 300, at 14-15.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss1/7

50

Giffin: West Virginia's Seemingly Eternal Struggle for Fiscally and Envir

2004]

COAL MINING RECLAMA TION BONDING PROGRAM

Fee and which would
ciencies in revenues produced from the Water Treatment
1
need be. 32
if
fee
the
to
changes
recommend
presumably
2.

Assessments Against Companies Currently Treating Water

If a coal company is currently treating water, under the Hicks Plan it
would be required to pay several different assessments into a vehicle generically
called a "Trust Fund. 322 The Trust Fund portion of the Hicks' Report is somewhat similar to other envirofomental bonding schemes that have been proposed
in the past. 323 Under what is referred to as a "flexible environmental assurance
bonding system," if an operator is responsible for known environmental damages, he is charged for those damages and is levied an assurance bond equal to
the "current best estimate of the largest potential future environmental damages
amount." 324 The bond is kept in an interest-bearing account for a predetermined time period. 325 Portions of the bond along with interest on the bond
principal can be returned to the offending operator, but only "if and when the
[operator] could demonstrate that the suspected, [future] worst-case damages
had not occurred or would be less than was originally assessed."' 326 If damages
did occur, "portions of the bond would be used to rehabilitate or repair the environment." 327 Portions of the bond might also be used to compensate injured
parties. 328 The advantage of this system is that the burden of proof concerning
damages would
future possible damages and the cost of the uncertainty of future
sector. 329
be shifted away from the public and towards the private
Under the Hicks Plan Trust Fund scheme, if a coal company produced
bad water, it cost $472,556 annually to treat this water, and the company produced 1.2 million tons of coal annually, the company would have to pay to DEP
either $249,903 or $721,659 per year.330 Forty-three thousand dollars of either
amount would be generated from the 3.6 cent per ton tax on coal that every coal

321

Id. at 16-17.

322

Id.at 1.

323

See Costanza & Cornwell, supra note 40.

324

Id.

325

See id.

326

Id.

327

Id.

328

Id.

329

See id.

330 HiCKS, supra note 300, at app. D. The figures in this hypothetical are based on calculations
presented in Appendix D of the Hicks Report. Id.
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producer has to pay under the Hicks Plan. 331 If the Coal Company chose to treat
its own bad water, it would effectively only pay to DEP $249,903. 332 Of this
$249,103, $43,000 would go to pay down the outstanding reclamation liabilities
that DEP's SRF is currently charged with. 333 The remaining $205,903 would 334
be
divided between two funds: a Risk Annuity Fund and a Sunset Annuity Fund.
Of the company's $205,903 in contributions, $94,511 would be directed into the
Risk Annuity Fund; the remaining $111,392 would become part of the Sunset
Annuity Fund. 335 Both the Risk Annuity Fund and the Sunset Annuity Fund
would provide a financial hedge against the possibility that a firm treating water
336
would for some reason leave a site unreclaimed.
Specifically, a coal mining operation would be required to contribute
money into a Sunset Annuity for a maximum period of 25 years. 337 For the first
eleven or so years, the operation would also have to contribute money into the
Risk Annuity. 338 The Risk Annuity assures that if one of the companies currently treating water fails and stops making payments into the Sunset Annuity
before 25 years have expired, the goals of the Sunset Annuity in raising $440
million can still be met and all of the companies making payments into the Sunset Annuity can still stop making payments into the Sunset Annuity approximately 25 years after the implementation of the Hicks Plan. 339 In less than
eleven years, the Risk Annuity would generate enough revenues topay
for 20%
34 °
of the total, current, private costs companies expend on treatment.
B.

The 20/20 Plan

Deciding that the Hicks Plan was too complicated to implement, 34 1 in
February 2001 DEP proposed a simpler fix to its bonding system woes. In this
proposal, DEP proposed to increase the special reclamation per ton coal tax established by West Virginia Code section 22-3-11 from 3 cents to 23 cents for a

332

Id.
Id.

333

Id.

334

Id.

331

335

Id.

336

Id.

337

Id. at 11.

338

ld.

339

Id. at 13-14.

340

Id. at 14.

341

Interview with John Ailes, Special Assistant to the Director of the Div. of Mining and Rec-

at 13.

lamation, W. Va. Dep't ofEnvtl. Prot. (Jan. 2003).
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period of 18 months and at the same time increase the maximum per acre bond
amount allowed for by West Virginia Code section 22-3-11 and -12 from $5000
to $20,000. 342 An increase in the maximum per acre bond limit would have
been helpful as the State's reclamation costs on abandoned mine site sites in
2000 cost an average of $5,400 per acre.343
This proposal to raise the special reclamation tax and the maximum per
acre bond limit was commonly known as the 20/20 Plan. According to DEP's
estimates, the 20/20 Plan would have raised about $625 million over the next 25
years to treat AMD at mine sites covered by DEP's Special Reclamation Program.344 However, coal industry
officials objected to DEP's 20/20 Plan, and it
345
was not successfully pursued.
C.

The 7&7 Plan

Following the industry's objections to the 20/20 Plan, DEP revised its
proposal to eliminate the deficit in the SRF and provide for water treatment at
bond forfeiture sites. This revised plan became known as the 7&7 Plan, or alternatively, the 7-Up Plan. The 7&7 Plan called for a permanent increase from
three cents to seven cents in the per ton clean coal tax imposed by West Virginia
Code section 22-3-11(h). 346 The 7&7 Plan also called for the collection of an
additional seven cent tax on each ton of clean coal mined; this additional tax
was designed to be collected for a period of thirty-nine months. 34 7 Over this
thirty nine month period, the receipts collected from the additional seven cent
34 8
per ton tax were designed to eliminate the $47.9 million deficit in the SRF.
After the expiration of the thirty-nine month period, assuming that a specially
342

Brian Bowling, Group Seeks Takeover of Mine Bonding System; FederalAgency Now Do-

ing Study of State Program,CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, Jan. 16, 2002, at 7A, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Charleston Daily Mail File.
Brian Bowling, Government Lawyer Confirms Bond System, Attorney for Agency Says
Mining Bond System is Legal, CHARLESTON DAILY MAIL, May 17, 2001, at 2A, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Charleston Daily Mail File.
284
Ken Ward, Jr., Coal Cleanups Could Cost $2.6 Billion, THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Apr. 2,
343

2001, at 1OA, available at LEXIS, News Library, Charleston Gazette File.
Ken Ward, Jr., Reclamation Tax Likely to Rise, DEP Chief Says, THE SUNDAY GAZETTEMAIL (Charleston, W. Va.), Jan. 12, 2003, at 5B.
346
Intra-office Memorandum from Rita Pauley, Assistant to the General Counsel, to Michael
345

Callaghan, Secretary, West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection, and Bill Adams,

Jr., Deputy Secretary and General Counsel, West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (Sept. 6, 2001) (on file with author). The permanent increase to seven cents a ton became
part of what is now West Virginia Code section 22-3-1 1(h). See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 67,446, 67,449 (Dec. 28, 2001).
347

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. at 67,449.

348

See id.
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appointed advisory committee found that the SRF was meeting certain financial
349
guarantees, the fourteen cents per ton tax would be cut to seven cents per ton.
The 7&7 Plan did not call for any increase in maximum per acre bonding limits.
On August 8, 2001, DEP submitted its 7&7 Plan by email to OSM's
Charleston Field Office for review and comment. On August 28, 2001, and
September 7, 2001, Roger Calhoun, Director of OSM's Charleston Field Office
responded with OSM's comments to DEP's proposed 7&7 Plan.3 50 Comments
from OSM on DEP's proposed 7&7 Plan were generally favorable, but highlighted some important issues with respect to the proposed legislation. In particular, OSM concluded that DEP's 7&7 Plan would generate sufficient revenues for about nine years, but future adjustments in the per ton coal tax would
351
have to be made to ensure the long-term financial solvency of the SRF.
The West Virginia Legislature passed the gist of DEP's 7&7 Plan in the
form of Senate Bill 5003 on September 15, 2001.
On September 17, 2001,
DEP notified OSM that Senate Bill 5003 had been passed, and on September 24,
2001, DEP formally submitted Senate Bill 5003 to OSM as proposed program
353
amendment.
Relying on an internal OSM directive that allows approval of a
proposed state ABS amendment that does not fully remedy all
deficiencies so long as [that amendment] does not adversely affect ABS solvency OSM approved the West Virginia amendment [in the form of Senate Bill 5003], but deferred the question of whether [West Virginia's legislation] would eliminate
the ABS deficit and 'ensure that sufficient money will be available to complete reclamation, including the treatment of354
polluted water, at all existing and future bond forfeiture sites.'

D.

Senate Bill 5003: The Final Version of the 7&7 Plan

As passed by the West Virginia State Legislature and approved by
OSM, DEP's 7&7 Plan, a.k.a. Senate Bill 5003, (1) establishes the SRF Advisory Council to ensure the effective, efficient, and financially stable operation of
349

See id.

350

See id. at 67,447.

351

See id.

352

See id.

353

Id. at 67,449.

W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 190 F. Supp. 2d 859, 865 (S.D. W. Va. 2002)
(citing and quoting 66 West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 FED. REG. at 67,451), modified by
238 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. W. Va. 2003).
354
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the SRF; (2) provides for a contract with a qualified actuary to determine the
SRF's soundness on a four-year basis; (3) increases the special reclamation tax
rate to provide additional revenue for the reclamation of bond forfeiture sites;
and (4) deletes language in the statute that limited expenditures from the State's
Alternative Bonding System for water treatment. 355 Amendments to West Virginia's regulatory program cannot be implemented and do not become effective
until OSM approves those amendments. 356 OSM bifurcated its approval of Senate Bill 5003. The increase in the reclamation tax called for by Senate Bill 5003
was approved by OSM in December 2001 and was implemented by DEP in
January 2002 in accordance with the provisions of West Virginia Code section
22-3-1 l(h). OSM solicited comments on the rest of Senate Bill 5003, and by
notice dated May 29, 2002, found that the amendments to the West Virginia
Alternative Bonding System would eliminate the SRF's existing $47.9 million
deficit in about three years, but also noted the SRF would only retain a positive
balance for about nine years. 357 Changes made to SCMRA by Senate Bill 5003
are noted below.
1.

Elimination of West Virginia Code Section 22-3-12(f)

West Virginia Code section 22-3-12(f) had required DEP to report to
the Legislature every 90 days of DEP's progress in developing and implementing the site-specific bonding requirements of West Virginia Code section 22-312. 3s 8 West Virginia developed and adopted interim site-specific bonding rules
in November of 1992. 359 In April 1993, West Virginia adopted final legislative
rules concerning site-specific bonding. 36 In October 1995, OSM approved
those rules. 36 1 Given West Virginia's adoption of rules implementing the sitespecific bonding requirements of West Virginia Code section 22-3-12, West
Virginia Code section 22-3-12(f) became irrelevant and362was stricken from the
West Virginia Code during the 2002 Legislative session.

355

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 37,610, 37,610 (May 29, 2002).
356 See D.K. Excavating, Inc. v. Miano, 549 S.E.2d 280, 283 (W. Va. 2001); 30 C.F.R. §

732.17(g) (2003).
357

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 67 Fed. Reg. at 37,613, 37,616.

358

W. VA. CODE § 22-3-12(f) (2001) (repealed 2002).

359
360

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 67,446, 67,450 (Dec. 28, 2001).
See id.

361 See id. at 67,446. Those rules are codified at W.VA. CODE ST. R. § 38-2-11(11.5) (2004).
362 See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. at 67,450.
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Addition of West Virginia Code Section 22-3-11 (n)

Subsection (n) of West Virginia Code section 22-3-11 was added during
the 2002 Legislative session. Subsection (n) provides that if the Legislature
makes future changes to West Virginia Code section 22-3-11, federal law requires a federal agency or official to approve those changes before the changes
become valid law.363 This provision is consistent with 30 C.F.R. § 732.17(g),
which states that whenever a State proposes to change its state coal mining regulatory program, the State shall immediately submit its proposed changes to the
shall take
Director of OSM and that no proposed changes to a State program
364
effect until those changes are approved by the Director of OSM.
3.

Clarification of Site Specific Language in West Virginia Code
Section 22-3-11 (a)

West Virginia Code section 22-3-12 allows an operator to site-specific
bond an entire permit.365 West Virginia Code section 22-3-11 (a) allows an operator to incrementally bond one area of the permit at a time. 366 Prior to Senate
Bill 5003's passage, West Virginia Code section 22-3-11 (a) required only that
each operator furnish a penal bond in the amount of $1,000 per acre, or a fraction thereof, for the increment of the permit that was to be bonded. 367 OSM
recommended revising West Virginia Code section 22-3-11 (a) to require that the
penal bond for a permit that was enjoying incremental bonding be a "minimum"
of $1,000 per acre. 3 68 Otherwise, OSM felt this provision would be arguably
inconsistent with West Virginia Code section 22-3-12(b)(1), which requires a
$5,000 per acre or fraction
penal bond of no less than $1,000 and no more than369
thereof whenever a site enjoys site specific bonding.
As revised by Senate Bill 5003, West Virginia Code section 22-3-11 (a)
increases the amount of the penal bond for incremental bonding from $1,000 per
acre to "not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars
for each acre or fraction thereof' that is permitted. 370 This revision, approved

363 W. VA. CODE § 22-3-11 (2004).
364

30 C.F.R. § 732.17(g) (2004).

365 W. VA. CODE § 22-3-12.
366 Id

§ 22-3-11(a).

367 See W. VA. CODE § 22-3-1 l(a) (2000) (amended 2001).
368 See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 67,446, 67,448 (Dec. 28, 2001).
369

See id.

370 W. VA. CODE § 22-3-11 (a) (2004).
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is subject to the same per-acre bondby OSM, clarifies that incremental bonding
371
bonding.
site-specific
is
as
ing rate range
4.

Removal of Cap on Water Treatment Expenditures-West Virginia Code Section 22-3-11 (g)

As part of the 7&7 Plan, the West Virginia Legislature eliminated statutory language that prevented the DEP from spending more than twenty-five percent of SRF monies on water treatment. 372 In the 2002 legislative session, the
Legislature eliminated corresponding language found in the West Virginia Code
of State Rules at section 38-2-12(12.5.d). 373 These changes were made in response to required amendments that OSM had imposed on the State regulatory
program in October 1995 and December 2001.374
Prior to these revisions in the West Virginia Code and also the Code of
State Rules, DEP was restricted in spending money from the SRF for water
treatment purposes, without regard to the amount needed to adequately treat
such sites and ensure compliance with applicable effluent limitations and water
quality standards. 375 The deletion of these provisions in the West Virginia Code
and the Code of State Rules was necessary to help DEP completely fund the
abatement or treatment of pollution discharges of water from bond forfeiture
sites. 3 76 Water treatment is an important part of reclamation and in some cases
may be required in perpetuity. Such treatment can become very costly at some
to spend more than twenty-five percent of its SRF,
sites and may require DEP 377
annually, on such treatment.

371

id.

372

Compare W. VA. CODE § 22-3-1 l(g) (2000) (amended 2001) with W. VA. CODE § 22-3-

12(g) (2004).
373

Prior to the change in the West Virginia Code of State Rules section 38-2-12(12.5.d), the
rule read: "Expenditures from the SRF for water quality enhancement projects shall not exceed

twenty-five percent (25%) of the funds gross annual revenue as provided in subsection g, section
11 of the [West Virginia] Act." W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 38-2-12(12.5.d) (2000) (amended 2001).
With the change in language made by the Legislature in 2003, section 38-2-12(12.5.d) reads as
follows: "In selecting such sites for water quality improvement projects, the Secretary shall determine the appropriate treatment techniques to be applied to the site. The selection process shall
take into consideration the relative benefits and costs of the projects." W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 382-12(12.5.d) (2004).
See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 51,900, 51,902 (Oct. 4, 1995); West
Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. at 67,449.
374

375

See W. VA. CODE § 22-3-11 (g) (2000) (amended 2001).

376

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. at 67,449.

377

Telephone interview with Charlie Miller, supra note 146.
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In addition to removing limitations on water treatment expenditures,
West Virginia Code section 22-3 -11 (g) retains the language which states DEP
"may," rather than "shall," "use the special reclamation fund for the purpose of
designing, constructing and maintaining water treatment systems when they are
required for a complete reclamation of the affected lands . ,,378 Ordinarily,
the use of the word "may" implies discretion. However, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has determined that DEP has a mandatory duty to use
bond monies for AMD treatment. 37 9 Moreover, the court has also held that
West Virginia Code section 22A-3-1 l(g), now codified as West Virginia Code
section 22-3-1 l(g), imposes upon DEP "a mandatory, non-discretionary duty to
utilize monies from the [SRF] . . ., to treat [AMD] at bond forfeiture sites when
the proceeds of the forfeited bonds are less than the actual cost of reclamation."380 On December 28, 2001, OSM had required West Virginia to amend
SCMRA to specify that monies from the SRF must be used, where needed, to
pay for water treatment on bond forfeiture sites. 38 1 Subsequent to the imposition of this requirement, OSM realized that a change in the relevant West Virginia Code section dealing with water treatment on a site, section 22-3-11(g),
was unnecessary because of the West Virginia Supreme Court's interpretation of
that provision in various cases. 382 As a result of the West Virginia Supreme
Court's ruling in the 1994 Highlands Conservancy case, 383 and West Virginia's
amendment of some of its administrative rules, OSM removed its required
amendment on May 29, 2002, as it felt that West Virginia's mining regulatory
program had adopted a mandatory requirement384that SRF monies be used for the
treatment of mine related pollution discharges.
378

W. VA. CODE § 22-3-11 (g) (2004).

379

See State ex rel. Laurel Mountain v. Callaghan, 418 S.E.2d 580, 584 (W. Va. 1992).
See State ex rel. W. Va. Highlands Conservancy, Inc. v. W. Va. Div. of Envtl. Prot., 447

380

S.E.2d 920, 925 (W. Va. 1994).
Despite the Laurel Mountain and Highlands Conservancy rulings by the supreme court, which act
to modify W.Va. Code section 22-3-11 (g), OSM is still requiring that the State amend its program
to specify that monies from the SRF must be used, where needed, to pay for water treatment on
bond forfeiture sites as it believes that the word "may" in subsection (g) of the Code improperly
provides the DEP with the discretion not to use SRF moneys for water treatment. See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 51,900, 51,902 (Oct. 4, 1995); West Virginia Regulatory
Program, 66 Fed. Reg. at 67,448.
381

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. at 67,449.

382

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 37,610, 37,612 (May 29, 2002).

383

W. Va. HighlandsConservancy, Inc., 447 S.E.2d at 920.

West Virginia Regulatory Program, 67 Fed. Reg. at 37,612. West Virginia Code of State
Regulation section 38-2-12(12.4.d) provides that the Secretary of DEP shall make expenditures
from the SRF to complete reclamation and shall take the most effective action possible to remediate AMD. W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 38-2-12(12.4.d) (2004). OSM has apparently interpreted section
38-2-2(2.37) to mean that all applicable effluent and applicable water quality standards must be
384
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5.

SRF Monies Not to Be Used to Reclaim AML Lands Eligible
for Federal Reclamation Funds-West Virginia Code Section
22-3-11 (h)

Senate Bill 5003 amended West Virginia Code section 22-3-11(h) to
clarify that
the SRF will not be used to reclaim abandoned mine sites which
can be reclaimed using federal AML reclamation funds. 385 This
change relates to Section 402(g)(4)(B) of SMCRA. 3 8 6 As enacted on November 5, 1990, Section 402(g)(4)(B) of SMCRA
authorizes the use of AML reclamation funds to perform land
reclamation on, and treat pollution discharges of water from, (1)
unreclaimed sites that were mined after August 4, 1977, under a
program other than a permanent regulatory program approved
by the Secretary of the Interior, and (2) permanent program
bond forfeiture sites with surety bonds for which the surety became insolvent on or before November 5, 1990. 387 In both
cases, SMCRA authorizes use of AML reclamation funds only
if funds available from the bond or other form of financial guarnot sufficient to provide adeantee or from any other source are
388
quate reclamation or abatement.
OSM has approved this change in West Virginia Code section 22-3-

11 (h). 389
6.

Changes in Use of the Fund for Administrative Expenses

West Virginia Code section 22-3-11 (g) previously stated that up to 10
percent of the monies in the SRF could be used for DEP's administrative expenses, including DEP's administration of SCMRA (found in Article 3 of the
West Virginia Code), West Virginia's AML program (found in Article 2 of the
West Virginia Code), the West Virginia Surface Mine Board, and West Virginia's regulatory program which regulates the surface mining and reclamation
of minerals other than coal, also known as the Quarry Reclamation Act (found
met either by the mine operator, or in the case of default, the regulatory agency to which the mine
site defaults. See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 67 Fed. Reg. at 37,612.
385

W. VA. CODE § 22-3-1 1(h) (2004).

386

See 30 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2000).

387

Id.

388

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 67,446, 67,448 (Dec. 28, 2001).

389

See id.
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in Article 4 of the West Virginia Code). 390 On October 4, 1995, OSM expressed
concern about DEP using money from the SRF for any expense not related to
bond forfeiture
reclamation since the SRF's liabilities at the time exceeded its
391
assets.

Based on a financial analysis that DEP submitted to OSM on November
11, 1985, OSM approved DEP's use of money from the SRF to cover general
administrative expense withdrawals for fiscal year 1985-86. 392 However, before
DEP was allowed to withdraw money from the SRF in subsequent years to pay
for administrative expenses, OSM required DEP to submit a comprehensive
analysis to OSM demonstrating that sufficient money would be available in the
SRF both to complete the approved reclamation plans for any mining area that
may be in default at any time and to cover the administrative expense withdrawals allowed by law. 393 Only if OSM agrees with DEP's assessment can DEP
withdraw money from its SRF to pay for administrative expenses as the plain
language of West Virginia Code section 22-3-11 (g) allows.39f
Given the deficit in the SRF and the condition it placed in 1985 on
DEP's use of SRF funds for administrative expenses, OSM encouraged DEP to
modify the language in West Virginia Code section 22-3-11(g) to explicitly
to administrative expenses dealing with the
limit expenditures from the SRF
395
Program.
Reclamation
Special
The Legislature did not adopt OSM's suggestion. As revised, the plain
language of West Virginia Code section 22-3-1 1(g) allows for up to 10 percent
of the monies in the SRF to be used for DEP's administration of the SCMRA
program, Article 3 of the West Virginia Code, and the Surface Mine Board allows an unlimited amount of money in the SRF to be used for administering the
396

Special Reclamation Program and the Special Reclamation Advisory Council.
The SRF can no longer be used by DEP to pay for the administrative expenses

390

W. VA. CODE § 22-3-11 (2000) (amended 2001).

Prior to the year 2000, W. VA. CODE

section 22-4-1 to -29, was designated as the "Surface Mining and Reclamation of Minerals Other
Than Coal" Act. W. VA. CODE § 22-4-1 to -29 (1999) (amended 2000). In 2000, the West Virginia Legislature re-designated this Act as the "Quarry Reclamation Act." W. VA. CODE § 22-4-1

(2004).
391

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 51,900, 51,901 (Oct. 4, 1995).

392

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. at 67,449.

393 See id.
394 See id.
Letter from Roger Calhoun, Director, Charleston Field Office, Office of Surface Mining, to
Michael 0. Callaghan, Secretary, West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (August
28, 2001) (on file with author) (containing an attachment describing OSM's recommended revisions to section 22-3-11 (g)).
396
W. VA. CODE § 22-3-11 (g) (2004).
395
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DEP incurs in administering the AML program or the Quarry Reclamation Act,
found in Chapter 22, Article 4 of the West Virginia Code.
West Virginia Code section 22-3-11, as revised, has been approved by
OSM, but only insofar as it allows for up to 10 percent of the SRF to be freely
3 97
used for administrative expenses relating to DEP's bond forfeiture program.
These expenses arguably include all administrative expenses DEP incurs while
operating its Special Reclamation Program and could include expenses that the
Special Reclamation Advisory Council incurs while in the normal course of its
operations. These expenses would also likely include expenses that DEP generates while dealing with bond forfeitures as part of its Article 3 regulatory program.
What OSM has not approved is the unchecked expenditures of money
from the SRF for expenses associated with the West Virginia Surface Mine
Board or DEP's administration of its Article 3 regulatory program, insofar as
As related by
those expenses are unrelated to bond forfeiture under SCMRA.
OSM, before making any withdrawals to cover administrative expenses unrelated to bond forfeitures, West Virginia must request and receive OSM concurrence for such withdrawals. 399 OSM has stated that to assist in restoring and
maintaining the financial solvency of the SRF, its restriction on DEP's withdrawals from the SRF will continue to apply to any withdrawals that are not
related to bond forfeiture reclamation administrative expenses. 40 Because of
OSM's conditional approval of West Virginia Code section 22-3-11(g), this
Code section has a provision which is not readily apparent from reviewing the
plain language of the statute.
7.

An Increase in the Base Per Ton Clean Coal Tax

Senate Bill 5003 increases the permanent per ton clean coal tax from
three cents per ton to seven cents per ton and imposes an additional seven cent
The effective date of the
per ton tax for a period of thirty-nine months.
for by West VirAs
provided
1,
2002.402
eleven cent tax increase was January
397

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. at 67,449.

398

See id.

399

See id.

400

See id

401 See W. VA. CODE § 22-3 -11 (h).
402

See id. DEP's draft of the 7&7 Plan called for tax collections of the increased tax to begin

on January 1, 2002. Intra-office Memorandum from Rita Pauley to Michael Callaghan, supra note
346. OSM recommended that tax collections begin upon the date of passage of the bill. Id. DEP
and the Legislature did not change this part of Senate Bill 5003 in response to OSM's comments
and the final version of Senate Bill 5003, as subsequently approved by OSM, called for tax collections of the increased tax to begin on January 1, 2002. See W. VA. CODE § 22-3-1 1(h).
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ginia Code section 22-3-1 1(h), after thirty-nine months, the SRF tax on tons of
clean coal mined is reduced from fourteen cents per ton to seven cents per ton.
The permanent seven cent per ton tax which remains after this reduction
"shall be reviewed and, if necessary, adjusted annually by the Legislature upon
recommendation of the [Special Reclamation Advisory] council," pursuant to
West Virginia Code section 22-1-17.403 This permanent seven cent per ton tax
"may not be reduced until the special reclamation fund has sufficient moneys to
4 4
meet the reclamation responsibilities of the state established in this section.
permit
must
Coal refuse reprocessing operations that require a surface mining 40
5
also pay the tax on the clean coal obtained by these mining methods.
Early drafts by DEP of a revised West Virginia Code section 22-3-11 (g)
called for the Special Reclamation Tax to be increased from three cents to seven
cents per ton, with the proviso that the "tax shall be reviewed and adjusted, if
necessary, every two years after the required recommendation of the Secretary
[of DEP] is made to the Legislature on the adequacy of the tax." 40 6 Another
provision of proposed West Virginia Code section 22-3-11 (g) called for the ex407
piration of the additional seven cents per ton tax on coal on April 1, 2005.
Comments from OSM on August 28, 2001, suggested that the special reclamation tax should not be lowered until the deficit in the State's Alternative Bonding System was eliminated. 40 8 Only some of OSM's suggestions were incorporated into the final version of Senate Bill 5003.
On September 7, 2001, OSM completed a financial analysis of a draft
tax
version of a legislative submission, which called for the special• reclamation
409
At that
rate to be increased to fourteen cents per ton of clean coal produced.
time, OSM concluded that it appeared that a proposed tax rate of fourteen cents
for up to thirty-nine months and seven cents thereafter would allow DEP to
eliminate the current SRF deficit and meet land reclamation and water treatment
needs for several years. 4 1 OSM's projections also indicated that, following
about a nine-year period of surplus in the SRF, the SRF's liabilities would exceed its assets and that future increases in the special reclamation tax rate would
be necessary at that time to. meet land and water reclamation and treatment

403

W.VA. CODE § 22-3-1 1(h).

4M

Id.

405

See id.; West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 67,446, 67,449 (Dec. 28, 2001).

406

Letter from Roger Calhoun to Michael 0. Callaghan, supra note 395.

407

Id.

408

Id.

409

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. at 67,449.
See id.

410
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needs. 4 11 Until that time occurs, OSM noted that West Virginia Code section
22-3-1 l(h) provides several mechanisms, such as the provision that the seven
cent per ton special reclamation tax may not be reduced until the SRF has sufficient monies to meet the State's reclamation responsibilities established by law,
the [SRF] from deteriorating to a point where its liabilities
that will "prevent4 12
exceed its assets."
8.

Removal of Language Preventing Accumulation of Assets in
the SRF

To further assist in shoring up the financial viability of the SRF, Senate
Bill 5003 removed language from West Virginia Code section 22-3-11 (g) which
provided that the special reclamation tax could only be collected when the
State's accrued reclamation liabilities exceeded the assets of the SRF. 4 13 In
effect, this provision had forced the SRF to operate with a deficit for much of its
existence. The change made in West Virginia Code section 22-3-11(g) was
enacted in response to a required amendment that OSM had imposed on West
Virginia's regulatory program in October 1995.414 In 1995, OSM had noted that
section 509(c) of SMCRA requires that an Alternative Bonding System have
sufficient money in it to complete the reclamation plan for any site that may be
in default at any time.4 15 OSM stated that "[a]n alternative bonding system canrevenues to
not be allowed to incur a deficit if it is to have available adequate
4 16
sites."
forfeiture
bond
outstanding
all
of
complete the reclamation
The deletion of language in West Virginia Code section 22-3-11 (g), the
addition of West Virginia Code section 22-3-11 (h), and the addition of West
Virginia Code section 22-1-17 relating to the creation of the SRF Advisory
balance to
Council, are all designed to assure that the SRF maintains a positive
•.• 417
meet the State's land reclamation and water treatment responsibilities.

411

See id.

412

Id. at 67449-50.

413

Compare W. VA. CODE § 22-3-11(g) (2000) (amended 2001) with W. VA. CODE § 22-3-

11 (g) (2004).
414

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 60 Fed. Reg. 51,900, 51,903 (Oct. 4, 1995).

415
416

See id.
Id.

417

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. at 67,449-50.
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The Establishment of a Special Reclamation Fund Advisory
Council

West Virginia Code section 22-1-17, a new section of the West Virginia
Code, creates a SRF Advisory Council ("Council") to monitor the fiscal health
of the SRF and to make reports to the Legislature and the Governor regarding
the SRF.41 8 The Council has eight members: the Secretary of the Department of
Environmental Protection (or designee), the Treasurer of the State of West Virginia (or designee), the Director of the National Mine Reclamation Center at
West Virginia University, and five members who are appointed by the Governor
with the advice and consent of the State Senate. 4 19 The original draft of the 7&7
Plan did not call for the Council to include a representative who was a member
of the scientific community and experienced in reclamation practices, including
water treatment methodology. 420 DEP reviewed OSM's suggestion that such a
member be included in the Council and as a result, the Director of the National
Mine21Reclamation Center at West Virginia University became a Council mem4
ber.
The five Council members appointed by the Governor include one person who represents the coal industry, one member who represents environmental advocacy organizations, one actuary or economist, one member who
422
represents coal miners, and one member who represents the general public.
Each of the Governor's appointees serves
six year terms, which are staggered,
423
and each appointee may be reappointed.
Under DEP's draft 7&7 Plan, all members of the Council, including
State government officials, were to be compensated the same for serving on the
Council. 424 OSM suggested that only appointed Council members, not the permanent State government officials who are on the Council, should be compensated for their service on the Council and further recommended that the funds
for compensating such members should come from the SRF. 425 DEP and the
Legislature accepted OSM's suggestions, and as a result appointed Council
members are paid the same compensation and expense reimbursement as is provided for members of the Legislature pursuant to West Virginia Code sections
418

W. VA. CODE § 22-1-17 (2004).

419 Id. § 22-1-17(a).
420

Letter from Roger Calhoun to Michael 0. Callaghan, supra note 395.

421

id.

422 See W. VA. CODE § 22-1-17(b).
423 See id. § 22-1-17(c).
424 Intra-office Memorandum from Rita Pauley to Michael Callaghan, supra note 346.
425 Letter from Roger Calhoun to Michael 0. Callaghan, supra note 395.
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4-2A-6 and 4-2A-8. 426 Council members who are state employees or officials
are not compensated for being on the Council, but they are reimbursed for exthe Council, in accordance with the policy
penses associated with their work on
427
work.
they
whom
for
agency
of the
The Secretary of DEP serves as the chairperson of the Council and calls
Council meetings as necessary, but no less frequently than once every six
months. 428 DEP's Secretary also provides administrative and technical services
430
DEP's Secfor the Council. 429 Of the Council's eight members, seven43vote.
1
member.
retary is the Council's lone, ex officio, nonvoting
Both the Council and the Legislature are charged with determining
whether the SRF has sufficient moneys to meet West Virginia's reclamation
responsibilities.4 32 As reflected in the West Virginia Code, Senate Bill 5003
creates the Council to ensure "the effective, efficient and financially stable operation of the [SRF]." 4 33 As required by West Virginia Code section 22-117(f)(l), the Council must "[s]tudy the effectiveness, efficiency, and financial
stability of the [SRF] with an emphasis on development of a financial process
that ensures the long-term stability of the special reclamation program." 34 The
Council is charged with identifying and defining problems relating to the SRF,
including the enforcement of federal and state law pertaining to contemporaneous reclamation. 435 In addition, the Council is charged with analyzing "bond
forfeiture collection, reclamation efforts at bond forfeiture sites, and [permittees'] compliance with approved reclamation plans" and modifications to those
plans. 436 West Virginia Code section 22-1-17(0(4) requires the Council to
"provide a forum for a full and fair discussion of issues relating to the
[SRF]. ' 4' 37 West Virginia Code section 22-1-17(0(6) provides that the Council
must "[s]tudy and recommend to the Legislature alternative approaches to the
current funding scheme of the [SRF], considering revisions which will assure
426

See W. VA. CODE § 22-1-17(d).

427

See id.

428

See id. § 22-1-17(e).

429

See id.

430

See id. § 22-1-17(a), (c).

431

See id.

432

See id §§ 22-1-17(a), (g), 22-3-1 1(h).

433

W. VA. CODE § 22-1-17(a).

434

Id. § 22-1-17(0(1).

435
436

See id. § 22-1-17(0(2).
Id. § 22-1-17(f)0(3).

437

Id. § 22-1-17(0(4).
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future proper reclamation of all mine sites and continued financial viability of
the state's coal industry."'438 Reclamation of mine sites includes meeting water
treatment obligations, and West Virginia Code section 22-1-17(f)(6) provides a
mechanism that, if properly implemented, could help assure proper future reclamation. 439 OSM interpreted that provision to mean that, "instead of relying
solely on a coal production tax, the ...Council must examine and recommend
other funding mechanisms such as a sinking fund, insurance, trust funds or escrow accounts
to meet the [SRF's long-term] bond forfeiture reclamation obli44 0
gations."
In addition to conducting its own study of the issues listed in the subsections of West Virginia Code section 22-1-17(f), the Council is required to contract with a qualified actuary and use that actuary to determine the fiscal soundness of the SRF. 44 1 Once every four years, the actuary must analyze both the
present and future assets and liabilities of the SRF to determine whether the SRF
is solvent.442 In making his determination, the actuary must consider the financial soundness of the SRF based on both the SRF's current and future assets and
liabilities.44 3 If the current and projected liabilities of the SRF outweigh the
current and projected assets, then the SRF is arguably fiscally unsound and
measures must be taken to fix this problem.
The actuarial report prepared for the Council's review does not have to
be submitted to the Legislature for its review; however, the Council must submit
an annual report to the Legislature which discusses the items, such as the actuarial report, the Council has reviewed during the course of its work.44 4 The Council's report must discuss the availability of federal AML funds to reclaim West
Virginia's Special Reclamation Program sites and must also discuss445the issues
studied by the Council under West Virginia Code section 22-1-1 7 ().

438

Id § 22-1-17(f)(6).

439

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 67,446, 67,448 (Dec. 28, 2001).
West Virginia Regulatory Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 37,610, 37,614 (May 29, 2002).

440
441
442

443

See W. VA. CODE § 22-l-17(f)(5).
See id.
See id.

See id. at § 22-1-17(g). Early drafts of DEP's 7&7 Plan called for a biennial reporting on
the adequacy of the reclamation tax. Letter from Roger Calhoun to Michael 0. Callaghan, supra
note 395. OSM felt that a once every two year analysis of the tax's adequacy would not be frequent enough, given the condition of the SRF, and recommended that there be an annual report
conducted on the adequacy of the tax for so long as the SRF was experiencing a deficit. Id. DEP
and the West Virginia Legislature adopted OSM's suggestion. See W. VA. CODE § 22-1-17(g).
444

44

See W. VA. CODE § 22-1-17(g).
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Most importantly, the Council's report must tell the Legislature whether
the special reclamation tax and fiscal condition of the SRF are adequate. 44 6 As
part of this analysis, the Council must recommend to the Legislature whether the
special reclamation tax should be increased, decreased, or left the same.447
When considering whether to recommend to the Legislature an adjustment of
the special reclamation tax, the Council is to analyze the "costs, timeliness, and
adequacy of bond forfeiture reclamation, including water treatment. ' 448 The
Council may recommend an increase or a decrease in the tax when the SRF is
solvent, but, because of the operation of West Virginia Code section 22-3-11(h),
the Council should not recommend that the tax be reduced if it has found that
the SRF is insolvent. 449 OSM has stated that if there are deficiencies in West
Virginia's Alternative Bonding System, "the Advisory Council must recommend changes to the Legislature and the Governor to assure that the deficit is
eliminated in a timely manner." 4 50 In a letter from OSM to DEP dated August
9, 2001, OSM noted that
after the existing backlog of bond forfeiture sites is addressed, it
appears the tax rate of 7 cents per ton may only be adequate for
a few years. We assume that the newly formed [Council], during this period, will have available sufficient information data to
determine the appropriate tax rate to ensure complete reclamation, including water treatment, of existing and future bond forfeiture sites. During the first two years that the 14-cent tax rate
is in effect, we will continue to work with you to identify probable long-term treatment needs and to refine cost estimate to determine45 what the tax rate will be to adequately address those
needs.

1

According to OSM, if the Council fulfills its statutory obligations, the
West Virginia Legislature and the Governor will have the information and data
they need to make sound decisions and effective adjustments to the special reclamation tax rate so that the SRF will maintain a positive balance to meet exist-

446

See id.

447

See id.

448

Id. § 22-1A-l(g)(l).

449

See id.§ 22-3-1 1(h).

450

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 37,610, 37,614 (May 29, 2002).

451

Letter from Roger Calhoun, Director, Charleston Field Office, Office of Surface Mining, to

Michael 0. Callaghan, Secretary, West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (Aug. 9,
200 1) (on file with author).
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obligations. 452 In its approval of Sening
and future
land and
water reclamation
ate Bill
5003, OSM
acknowledged
that
[i]n the event that the Legislature and the Governor do not approve the Council's recommendations, [OSMI will reevaluate
the adequacy of the State's ABS and, if appropriate, provide notification to West Virginia under 30 CFR 732.17(c) and (e) that
it must amend its program to restore consistency with the Federal requirements.
As previously mentioned, to maintain the adequacy of West Virginia's
Alternative Bonding System, the Council may recommend alternative approaches to the funding scheme of the SRF. 454 The Council may also recommend adjustments in the current special reclamation tax.455 It is obvious why
the Council would recommend an increase in the special reclamation tax when
the SRF is insolvent. However, it may be less obvious as to why the Council
would recommend an increase or decrease in the tax when the SRF is solvent.
a.

Increasing the Special Reclamation Tax

i.

Imminent Harms to the Environment

An increase in the SRF tax may be warranted if reclamation needs to be
completed on a more expedited basis. This might occur if there are imminent
environmental harms that must be addressed through reclamation. Assume that
West Virginia featured 100 sites that needed to be reclaimed. Under an ordinary
construction schedule, all 100 sites could be fully reclaimed within a one year
period at a cost of twenty million dollars; however, several of these sites may
feature conditions that presently pollute the environment. Examples of such
pollution might include the deposition of AMD or aquatic life-choking silt into
West Virginia's waters. When such pollution is occurring, it may be advantageous to contract for reclamation on an expedited basis that will allow reclamation to be completed within, say, a four-month period. In this case, the costs of
reclamation would be higher and an increase in the special reclamation tax to
pay for this expedited reclamation would be advantageous. One contemporary
example of the need for expedited reclamation on an abandoned mine site can
452

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 67,446, 67,448 (Dec. 28, 2001).

453

West Virginia Regulatory Program, 67 Fed. Reg. at 37,614.

454

See W. VA. CODE § 22-1-17(t)(6).

455

See id. § 22-1-17(g)(1).
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been seen by reclamation which took place at the Antaeus Gary site in southern
West Virginia during the summer of 2002.456 In May 2002, after multiple black
water discharges from the site, DEP's Special Reclamation Program discovered
that two large coal refuse impoundments on the site were in imminent danger of
collapsing. 457 If the refuse impoundments had collapsed, there would be a severe loss of life and/or property in the area surrounding the former mining site,
possibly much like that seen in the Buffalo Creek disaster in West Virginia,
which took place in the early 1970s. 45 Given these potential problems, DEP
proceeded to reclaim the site on an emergency basis. 459 This meant that DEP
and/or its contractors worked at the site twenty four hours a day, seven days a
week from
.• May
. . 4, 2002,
460 through September 30, 2002, to remedy the presented
The total cost to DEP of reclaiming the Antaeus Gary
and imminent dangers.
site ended up being $7,645,862. 46 1 Had DEP not proceeded with emergency
reclamation, and the site could have been reclaimed on a normal, nonemergency schedule, the project likely would have taken between fifteen and
eighteen months and would have spanned a two year period, as the project
It is difficult
would not have been completed within one construction season.
to estimate the costs of the project if the project had proceeded under a normal
it is possible that the cost of the project would
reclamation schedule; however,463
have been less than it was here.
Charlie Miller, head of DEP's Special Reclamation Program, reports
that had DEP's 7&7 Plan not gone into effect prior to DEP's reclamation of the
Antaeus Gary site, work on certain other ongoing DEP reclamation projects
likely would have ceased and new projects would not have started, until the Antaeus Gary project had been completed and the SRF had received more per ton
coal receipts at its then three cent level. 464 If more special reclamation sites
feature a need to abate imminent environmental harms such as those seen at the
Antaeus Gary site, additional pressures will be placed on the SRF, and this may
force DEP to petition the Legislature for an increase in the special reclamation
tax.

456

Telephone interview with Charlie Miller, supra note 146.

457

Id.

458

Id.

459

Id.

460

Id.

461

Id.

462

Id.

463

Id.

464

Telephone interview with Charlie Miller, supra note 146.
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The Goals of the Special Reclamation Program Change

An increase in the special reclamation tax may also be warranted if the
SRF is currently solvent but DEP finds that the components of its reclamation
program are not sufficiently protecting the environment, the scope of the reclamation DEP requires must change, and this enlarged scope of reclamation is
accompanied by increased cost. An example of this situation might be seen in
the treatment of water pollution from a mine site. Assume, for example, that
DEP must currently treat water emanating from a mine site to ensure that levels
of iron, acidity, manganese, and aluminum are not higher than the technology
based water quality limitations currently placed on those constituents. These
limits might currently feature a daily maximum and a monthly average. Also,
assume that the cost of treating the water to ensure that those constituents are
not present in levels above their daily maximum or monthly average allowable
levels is currently $5,000 per month. If DEP decided to treat more constituents,
or was required to reduce the existing contamination of the current constituents
to lower levels, say from 3 mg/L to 1 mg/L, then the monthly cost of water
treatment at a site would likely increase. This increase might require a corresponding increase in the special reclamation tax.
iii.

The Number
Increases

of

Bond

Forfeiture

Sites

As of June 30, 2004, West Virginia's Special Reclamation Program included 433 unreclaimed bond forfeiture sites.
If this number materially increases, the SRF will need more money to reclaim these sites. Current revenues
from the special reclamation tax may not be great enough to fund reclamation at
these additional sites; such a scenario would force a change, either a tax increase
or some other change, to reestablish the solvency of the State's Special Reclamation Program.
b.

Reducing the Special Reclamation Tax

Discretionary reductions in the reclamation tax may be warranted if the
interest return on monies invested in the SRF combined with the annual receipt
of special reclamation taxes produce a SRF surplus that is projected to cover the
cost of all outstanding bond forfeiture reclamation, including water treatment.
In the present case, however, it appears as though this will not happen, at least in
the short run.
465

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RECLAMATION FUND ADVISORY COUNCIL TO THE WEST VIRGINIA

LEGISLATURE app. M (August 10, 2004) [hereinafter REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RECLAMATION FUND
ADVISORY COUNCIL 2004] (on file with author).
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c.

Otherwise Modifying the CurrentScheme of the Special Reclamation Fund

In addition to recommending tax increases and decreases, the Council
may also choose to recommend changes in the very structure of West Virginia's
SRF. The Council is charged with maintaining the present and future solvency
of the SRF; tax adjustments may not be sufficient or the preferred method of
maintaining the SRF's solvency. Changes to the structure of the SRF could
come in many different forms; one change might involve the adoption of a funding system similar to that recommended by the Hicks Report in lieu of, or in
addition to, the current SRF system.
Making even the most minute structural changes to West Virginia's
SRF currently requires direct legislative approval as West Virginia's SRF is
embedded in provisions of West Virginia Code which cannot be altered without
the assent of the Legislature. As demonstrated by the history of West Virginia's
Alternative Bonding System, requiring prior legislative approval for changes in
the SRF can often be an inefficient way to solve funding shortfalls in the SRF.
If the current Alternative Bonding System continues to struggle with its adequacy, it might be appropriate for the Council to advocate the creation of an
SRF that can more quickly respond to realized shortfalls in the SRF. This SRF
might allow DEP and OSM to make modest changes in the SRF without requiring prior legislative approval and also allow the Legislature to maintain a general oversight role over changes made by DEP in the SRF program.
E.

The Legislature'sCurrentRole in FurtherModifying West Virginia's
Alternative Bonding System

After the Council makes its annual findings and reports those findings
to the West Virginia Legislature, it is the Legislature's current responsibility
under the law to review those findings and to subsequently make the final dehas enough money in it to meet West Virtermination as to whether the SRF
. ... 466
If the Legislature determines that there
ginia's reclamation responsibilities.
are insufficient monies in the SRF to meet West Virginia's reclamation responmoney in the SRF to
sibilities, then it must act to assure that there is 46enough
7
meet West Virginia's reclamation responsibilities.
OSM has stated, and the Federal District Court for the Southern District
has noted, that

466

See W. VA. CODE § 22-3-1 1(h) (2004); West Virginia Regulatory Program, 67 Fed. Reg.

37,610, 37,615 (May 29, 2002).
467
See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 37,615.
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in the event that the Legislature and the Governor do not approve the Council's recommendations, we will reevaluate the
adequacy of the State's [Alternative Bonding System] and, if
appropriate, provide notification to West Virginia under 30 CFR
§ 732.17(c) and (e) that it must amend
its program to restore
468
consistency with Federal requirements.
If the Legislature does not maintain the solvency of the SRF by adopting the suggestions of the Council, West Virginia will have to begin implementing the federal bonding program and OSM may ultimately take over West Virginia's reclamation bonding program, eliminating the primacy of regulation that
West Virginia currently enjoys in this area.
VIII. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF CHANGES MADE BY SENATE BILL

5003

TO WEST

VIRGINIA'S BONDING PROGRAM

Prior to the implementation of Senate Bill 5003, the West Virginia
Highlands Conservancy continued its civil action in the federal District Court
for the Southern District of West Virginia against OSM and others seeking judicial relief for what the Highlands Conservancy perceived as inadequacies in
West Virginia's bonding program and OSM's lack of oversight in correcting
those inadequacies. Following the commencement of this civil action, the Legislature amended West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System by adopting Senate Bill 5003. Despite the implementation of Senate Bill 5003, the Highlands
Conservancy maintained its challenge to West Virginia's Alternative Bonding
System, claiming that the amended system was still inadequate to meet the requirements of SMCRA and that OSM, in its oversight role over DEP, should not
be allowing DEP to maintain and implement West Virginia's bonding laws, as
revised by the West Virginia Legislature in 2001 and 2002. 4 69 On June 26,
2002, the Highlands Conservancy argued that OSM's continued approval of
West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System and OSM's failure to adequately
respond to the Highland Conservancy's comments on this bonding program
"were arbitrary, capricious, and inconsistent with SMCRA." '470 As relief, the
Highlands Conservancy requested that the court order OSM to set aside its approval of West Virginia's amended Alternative Bonding System on December
28, 2001 and May 29, 2002, take over West Virginia's bonding program, and1
47
"issue only site-specific, full cost bonds to cover the costs of reclamation."
The Highlands Conservancy also requested that the court force OSM to imme48

Id. at 37,614.

469

W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 238 F. Supp. 2d 761, 765 (S.D. W. Va. 2003).

470

Id.

471

Id.
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diately undertake "a full and complete site-specific analysis of all water and land
reclamation liabilities" that coal operators were responsible for in West Virginia
in a two year time period of
and then complete a thorough actuarial risk analysis
4
7
companies.
by
owed
liabilities
all of reclamation
One of the Highlands Conservancy's complaints against OSM concerned OSM's December 2001 partial approval of West Virginia's Alternative
Bonding System. The Highlands Conservancy maintained that OSM could not
grant partial approval to West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System. 473 The
Highlands Conservancy felt that OSM must either entirely reject or entirely approve West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System and that partial approval
would only cause the Alternative Bonding System to suffer what it had suffered
over the last twenty plus years: infinitely small and unending improvements
which tinkered with West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System but never allowed it to reach a statutorily satisfactory end.4 74 Judge Haden responded by
noting that "OSM has promised to make its final and determinative decision" on
the adequacy of West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System by no later than
May 28, 2002, "so the spectre Plaintiff raises is unreal." 475 Haden noted that
"the Court and the public have OSM's promise, if the amendment is not ap[to take over the State's Alternative
proved, [OSM's] Part 733 proceedings
476
begin.'
will
program]
System
Bonding
On May 29, 2002, OSM fully approved the changes made by Senate
Bill 5003 to the State's Alternative Bonding System. 477 OSM found that the
amendments to the State Alternative Bonding System were adequate to eliminate the SRF's $47.9 million deficit in about three years. 4 78 OSM also gave the
caveat that further review needed to be conducted of West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System to ensure continued adequacy. 479 Prior to its approval of
changes made to West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System by Senate Bill
5003, OSM predicted that at the expiration of the nine-year period following the
passage of Senate Bill 5003, further adjustments in the SRF would be needed to
pay for0 the completion of bond forfeiture reclamation, including water treat48
ment.
472

Id.

473

See W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 190 F. Supp. 2d 859, 868 (S.D. W. Va.

2002), modifiedby 238 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. W. Va. 2003).
474

Id. at 868-69.

475

Id.

476

Id.

477

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 37,610 (May 29, 2002).

478

See id. at 37,613.

479

See id. at 37,615.

480

See DAVID G. HARTOS & CAREY, OFFICE OF SURFACE MINING

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 2004

RECLAMATION AND

73

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 107, Iss. 1 [2004], Art. 7
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 107

OSM's May 29, 2002 approval of West Virginia's amendments to its
Alternative Bonding System were followed by a hearing on the Highlands Conservancy's motion for summary judgment and permanent injunction against
OSM on the adequacy of West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System. On
January 9, 2003, Haden found that OSM had not acted arbitrarily, capriciously,
or otherwise inconsistent with the law in approving West Virginia's Alternative
Bonding System as revised by the West Virginia Legislature in 2001 and
2002. 481 In the court's words, OSM's responses to, calculations of, and projections of the fiscal health of the current West Virginia Alternative Bonding Syssuch as it is, are "based on reasontem, and its current approval of that program,
482
factors."
relevant
the
of
able consideration
In support of its attempt to obtain a permanent injunction against OSM,
the Highlands Conservancy had argued that "OSM may only approve an [Alternative Bonding System] that is fully sufficient, at the time of its approval, to
cover all potential defaults" which might occur in West Virginia's mining industry. 4 3 OSM had responded by saying that "as long as the [7&7 Plan] amendment [to the law] provides a mechanism for remedying [Alternative Bonding
System] inadequacies in a reasonable fashion, we can approve it as being consistent with 30 C.F.R. § 800.1 l(e)." 484 The court noted that OSM, importantly,
conditioned its approval of West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System upon
the future actions of the State of West Virginia, and in particular, the actions of
the State Legislature and Governor. 485 In the court's words,
[T]he current deficit [in West Virginia's SRF] is evidence of an
inadequate rate, but not the inability of an Alternative Bonding
System structured like that of West Virginia to provide sufficient funds, when needed. The inadequacy [of the SRF] can be
corrected by an adequate rate increase and a mechanism to enpace with reclamation needs, once the deficit
sure the rate keeps
486
is eliminated.

ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, A REPORT ON THE '7-UP' PLAN: A FINANCIAL
ANALYSIS OF WEST VIRGINIA'S INFORMAL PROPOSAL TO MODIFY THE ALTERNATIVE BONDING

SYSTEM OF THE WEST VIRGINIA SURFACE MINING REGULATORY PROGRAM 7 (2001); see also West
Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. at 37,613.
481 W. Va. Highlands Conservancy v. Norton, 238 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. W. Va. 2003).
482

Id. at 773.

483

Id. at 767.

484

Id. (quoting West Virginia Regulatory Program, 67 Fed. Reg. at 37,614).

485 See id. at 773.
486

Id.at 771.
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The court noted that during the 2001 Legislative Session the law was
adjusted to increase the special reclamation rate and that a mechanism, the Special Reclamation Advisory Council, was established to ensure that the reclamation tax will keep pace with reclamation needs. 487 The court also noted that if
the Alternative Bonding System becomes inadequate and the Legislature and the
Governor do not properly act to rectify this inadequacy, it will be incumbent
upon OSM to withdraw its approval of West Virginia's Alternative Bonding
System
and to take over the bonding of coal mining operations in West Vir•• 488
ginla.

IX.

A REVIEW BY THE SPECIAL RECLAMATION ADVISORY COUNCIL OF

RECENT CHANGES MADE TO WEST VIRGINIA'S BONDING AND RECLAMATION

PROGRAM

In January 2003, the Special Reclamation Advisory Council completed
489
its first annual report on the status of the SRF under the new bonding laws.
This report analyzed the operation of the SRF during the 2002 calendar year and
49
contained several interesting findings, recommendations, and predictions. 0
The Council's report provides some prediction as to the future of the SRF and
the West Virginia SCMRA bonding program.491
A.

Significant Increase in Revenues From the Increase in the SRF Tax

According to the Advisory Council's report, had DEP not increased the
Special Reclamation Tax from three cents to fourteen cents per ton of clean coal
mined, the SRF's revenues for calendar year 2002 would have only been
$4,252,899. 492 As it was, the SRF's revenues for the months of February, 2002,
through December, 2002, were $14,353,438. 493 Without the increase in the
special reclamation tax from three cents to fourteen cents for the thirty nine
month period, the SRF's revenues would have been $10,100,539 less. While an
improvement over prior receipts, monthly tax receipts for 2002 were lower than
those contemplated by OSM for 2002 prior to the implementation of Senate Bill
5003. 4 9 4 In December, 2001 OSM projected that at production levels then being
487

See id. at 771-73.

488

See id. at 773-74.

489

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RECLAMATION FUND ADVISORY CouNcIL 2003, supra note 319.

490

Id.

491

Id.
Id. at 2 tbl.

492

1.

493

See id.

494

See West Virginia Regulatory Program, 66 Fed. Reg. 67,446, 67,448 (Dec. 28, 2001).
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attained, the new fourteen cent tax would increase cash flow into the SRF by
about $1.9 million/month. 495 As it was, cash flow into the SRF, at least during
the year 2002, only increased by $1,029,106 per month-a significant difference. 496 Due to a weak economic market for coal, OSM's statements in May
2002 that the new 7&7 Plan will generate sufficient revenues at its current per
deficit that existed in 2001 in
ton assessment levels to eliminate the reclamation
497
about three years may prove to be incorrect.
UnplannedExpenditures From the Fund in the Year 2002

B.

While the SRF experienced higher revenues in 2002 due to the implementation of the 7&7 Plan, it also incurred higher than expected expenditures
due to DEP's reclamation of the Antaeus Gary site. 498 In its report, the Advisory Council noted that the approximately $7.6 million DEP was required to
expend on the site was "unanticipated and affected short-term cash flow dramatically."A99 While the Antaeus Gary situation is hoped to be an aberration,
the SRF must be ready to respond to such aberrations to maintain its short term
and long-term solvency.
Additional ProgramActivities by DEP

C.

As a result of its receipt of the SRF's increased revenues in 2002, DEP
was able to modify treatment and reclamation plans on abandoned mine sites,
purchase new support equipment, hire and train new personnel, and plan and
start reclamation for additional abandoned mine sites. 5 0 During 2002, DEP's
Special Reclamation Program contracted for $11.9 million of reclamation on
mining sites abandoned after 1977.501 By April of 2003, DEP had already en495

Id.

496

See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RECLAMATION FUND ADVISORY COUNCIL

2003, supra note 319,

1.
at2 tbl.
497 See West Virginia Regulatory Program,67 Fed.Reg. 37,610, 37,613 (May29, 2002).
498

See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RECLAMATION FUND ADVISORY COUNCIL

2003, supra note 319,

at 3 tbl. 2.
499 Id.
S0o See id. at 3, 5, apps. D, E, J, K, L, M, and N.
501

Telephone interview with Ramona Dickson, Department of Environmental Protection Fiscal

Services, Office of Administration (Apr. 17, 2003). This $11.9 million figure is somewhat
skewed given DEP's emergency expenditure encumbrance of $7.6 million at the Antaeus Gary
site during 2002. Telephone interview with Charlie Miller, Special Reclamation Office, West
Virginia Department of Environmental Protection (Apr. 17, 2003). Nevertheless, even discounting all of the Antaeus Gary expenditures, the DEP was able to perform more reclamation in 2002
($2.2 million worth more) after the passage of Senate Bill 5003 than it was able to perform during
2001 prior to changes in the bonding law. Id.
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tered into contracts for $7.2 million worth of reclamation work for fiscal year
2003.502 These figures compare favorably with the Special Reclamation Program's expenditures on reclamation prior to the passage of Senate Bill 5003. In
2001 before Senate Bill 5003 took effect, the Special Reclamation Program, due
to fiscal limitations imposed on its budget by prior law, was only able to spend

$2.08 million on reclamation projects. 53W
As mentioned, DEP continues to hire new personnel to help it fulfill its

special reclamation responsibilities.5 04 The hiring of new personnel is critical to
the speed at which DEP can complete reclamation of bond forfeiture sites.
Whenever DEP conducts a special reclamation project, it prepares a reclamation
plan for the site based on the reclamation plan in the permit, or one which otherwise meets the requirements of the State and federal mining regulatory programs.50 5 Through West Virginia's bidding process, DEP then hires private
construction contractors to perform reclamation on the site. 5 0 6 DEP must ensure
that the contractors are performing reclamation on schedule and in accordance
with the plans and specifications that are incorporated into the contract entered
it can
into between the contractor and DEP. When DEP
•. has more inspectors,
507
The fact that
oversee reclamation at a larger number of sites simultaneously.
DEP hired six new inspectors and filled several other positions during 2002
means that it will be able to complete reclamation at a larger number of sites
within a given time period than it had been able to do prior to 2002. To meet its
increased workload, DEP plans to continue its hiring of new personnel, increasSpecial
Reclamation Program from 10.25 to
ing the number of positions in its..
508
Funding
for these positions will come
positions.
27.15 full time equivalent
50 9
OSM.
and
SRF
the
from
Recommendations as to Future Water Treatment Systems

D.

One of the charges of the Advisory Council is to "provide a forum for a
full and fair discussion of issues relating to the SRF." 5 10 The discharge(s) of

502 Telephone interview with Charlie Miller, supra note 501.
503

Id.

504 Id.
505

Id.

506

Id.

507

Id.

508

Telephone interview with Charlie Miller, supra note 146.

509

Id.

510

See W. VA. CODE § 22-1-17(0(4) (2003).
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polluted water from an abandoned mine site is one of the most vexing problems
which DEP must contend with when reclaiming that site.
In its January, 2003 report, the Council recommended that DEP develop
discharges." 51 I
a process for "identifying environmental risk of individual site
Specifically, the Council suggested that "environmental risk assessment should
evaluate the threat to the receiving stream if the discharge is untreated." 512 This
risk assessment would include an analysis of the special reclamation site's pollutant loadings and an analysis of the quality and assimilative capacity of
The Council suggested that
streams into which runoff from the site occurs.
"for many sites, particularly those discharging into polluted streams, it may
make more sense to invest in a single[,] in-stream [treatment system] higher up
[in] the watershed, thus recovering more miles of stream at a more manageable
5 14

cost."

While this particular Advisory Council's recommendation is certainly
laudable, time will tell as to whether this recommendation can be implemented.
One impediment to this future treatment approach may be the future implemenTo comply with new
tation of West Virginia's new anti-degradation rules.
anti-degradation rules, it may be necessary to place treatment systems at each
abandoned mine site; constructing a "regional" treatment system for a watershed
may not meet anti-degradation requirements.
Future Concerns With the Adequacy of the Special ReclamationFund

E.

One important concern raised by the Advisory Council's year 2003 report is that the SRF's future revenues may be outpaced by its future expenditures. In its report, the Advisory Council refrained from suggesting that the
Special Reclamation tax should be increased in the 2003 West Virginia Legislaof available data and the current adetive session, "[g]iven the short duration
5 16
revenues."
[current]
the
of
quacy
However, the Council also noted that "the projected cash flow balance
in 2003 presents a concern to the Council." 5 17 "Given the projected balance of
511

See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RECLAMATION FUND ADVISORY COUNCIL 2003, supra note 319,

at 7.
512

Id.

513

See id.

514

Id.

515

See M. Ann Bradley & Joseph M. Dawley, West Virginia's Anti-degradation Policy for

State Waters: From Theoretical Construct to Implementation Procedures, 103 W. VA. L. REV.

301 (2001), for a good discussion of new anti-degradation rule requirements.
516

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RECLAMATION FuND ADVISORY COUNCIL 2003,

7-8.
517

Id. at 7.

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol107/iss1/7

supra note 319, at

78

Giffin: West Virginia's Seemingly Eternal Struggle for Fiscally and Envir
COAL MINING RECLAMATION BONDING PROGRAM

2004]

to
the [SRF] in 2003 the Council will formally consider a recommendation
5 18
change the rate or duration of [the] SRF tax in our 2003 mid-year meeting."
These sentiments were echoed in a speech made to the West Virginia
Coal Association on January 10, 2003 by the-then Secretary of the Department
of Environmental Protection Michael Callaghan. While speaking to the Coal
Association, Secretary Callaghan noted that the SRF tax may need to be increased as early as 2004 and that the Advisory Council will probably recom5
mend an increase in the permanent tax by one to two cents for the year 2004. 19
Such an increase would raise the permanent tax520from seven cents a ton to eight
or perhaps nine cents a ton of clean coal mined.
Callaghan noted that a lower than expected projected year 2003 fund
balance was likely as a result of two factors: one, a decrease in statewide coal
production during 2002, and two, the unexpected emergency expenditures by
DEP on the Antaeus Gary project between May/June and November of 2002.521
While the approximately $7.6 million spent on the Antaeus Gary site was a onetime expenditure and the site will not require future payments from the SRF,
DEP may be required to undertake similar emergency reclamation efforts at
other special reclamation sites in the future. Buttressing DEP against these future, unplanned expenditures and possible reductions in tax receipts from the
special reclamation tax may justify future increases in the per ton coal tax currently imposed by statute.
X. PREDICTING THE FUTURE OF WEST VIRGINIA'S RECLAMATION BONDING
PROGRAM

Where do West Virginia's Alternative Bonding System and Special
Reclamation Program go from here?
In its evaluation report for West Virginia's mining regulatory program
for the year 2003, OSM noted that while the year 2001 changes in West Virginia
Alternative Bonding System had not resulted in a perfect system, those changes
"provide a basis from which DEP can initiate action to ensure the long-term
success" of its Alternative Bonding System. 22 OSM noted that the year 2001
changes have allowed DEP to "hire additional bond forfeiture reclamation staff,
continue its effort to eliminate the Alternative Bonding System deficit, begin
work on the backlog of more than 400 unreclaimed bond forfeiture sites within
West Virginia, and to initiate treatment of pollutional discharges at sites that
518 Id.
519 See Ward, supra note 345, at 5B.
520

Under this suggestion, however, the additional seven cent per ton tax imposed by West

Virginia Code section 22-3-11 would still expire on schedule.
521

See Ward, supra note 345, at 5B.

522

ANNUAL EVALUATION SUMMARY REPORT 2003, supra note 2, at 6.
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require such treatment." 523 The main feature of the 2001 changes-the increased special reclamation tax-has generated, on average, about $18.6 million
annually for West Virginia's reclamation efforts which include long term treatWhether
ment of pollutional discharges coming from bond forfeiture sites.
this level of revenue generation will be sufficient remains to be seen. As of June
30, 2004, DEP still had a backlog of 433 bond forfeited abandoned mine lands
that it had to reclaim. 5 DEP's total estimated liability for reclaiming those
sites and other sites featuring ongoing water treatment was $50,358,728. 526 As
of July 31, 2004, DEP's total estimated liability for reclaiming its bond forfeited
sites, including those needing long term water treatment, totaled $69,224,693,
while its SRF balance totaled only $32,719,509. 527 Whether revenues generated
from the tax increases that went into effect starting in 2001 will be sufficient to
produce enough revenue to both address the backlog and current reclamation
needs of West Virginia's Special Reclamation Program remains to be seen.
Estimating the future of the SRF on a long-term basis is very difficult due to the
dependency of the SRF on the uncertain future health of the coal industry. If the
coal industry is healthy, it will produce a large number of tons of coal and this
will bolster the revenues of the SRF. A healthy coal industry may also produce
fewer abandoned mine sites and put less of a strain on DEP's Special Reclamation Program. On the other hand, an ill industry will produce less revenue for
the SRF and may at the same time increase the outlays needed from the SRF if
there are an increased number of abandoned mine sites that DEP has to take
over.
Unfortunately, the health of the mining industry is extremely difficult to predict. Thus far, an actuarial study has not been conducted to determine with any certainty what the failure rate of coal companies will be. Being incapable of predicting the rate at which coal companies fail, the rate at
which the State of West Virginia will be forfeiting permits in the future, the
numbers of acres associated with those forfeited permits which will need to
be reclaimed, and the cost of reclaiming those acres makes it virtually impossible to predict, at least on a long-term basis, the financial needs of West
Virginia's Special Reclamation Program.
If short-term or long-term shortfalls are projected in the Special Reclamation Program, further increases in the permanent seven-cent per ton reclamation tax are possible. Besides increasing the per-ton of coal tax, other changes
523

Id.

524

Id.

525

See REPORT OF THE SPECIAL RECLAMATION FUND ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 465, at

app. M.
526

See id.

527

Telephone interview with Charlie Miller, Special Reclamation Office, West Virginia De-

partment of Environmental Protection (Aug. 16, 2004).
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in the West Virginia Special Reclamation Program may be proposed. One suggestion has been "to apply the Special Reclamation Tax to all coal produced, not
just clean coal." 528 So far, however, proposals to change the Special Reclamation Program remain just that-proposals.
XI. CONCLUSION

West Virginia's attempts to ensure proper environmental reclamation of
coal mined lands began well before the 1977 passage of SMCRA. However,
both prior to and after SMCRA's passage, the goal of properly and completely
reclaiming all unreclaimed, abandoned coal mine sites has been difficult to attain.
Often a coal company will abandon a mining site before finishing site
reclamation. Rather than leave that site unreclaimed and in a condition that will
harm the environment, state and federal governments have stepped in to reclaim
the site.
In West Virginia, DEP's Special Reclamation Program takes care of reclaiming sites abandoned by coal operators after 1977. The Special Reclamation Program's efforts are funded through contributions by existing coal permittees, be it contributions from per acre bonding requirements, civil penalties, or a
generalized tax on those permittees' production of coal. Unfortunately, the Special Reclamation Program's efforts to reclaim mine sites abandoned after 1977
have been chronically underfunded due to the historically legally inadequate
nature of West Virginia's reclamation program, including its post- 1977 SCMRA
Alternative Bonding System. Underfunding of DEP's reclamation efforts has
resulted in a situation where today, thousands of acres of unreclaimed and abandoned mine sites sit idle, open to the ravages of nature and primed to harm the
environment.
Legislation passed in 2002 has attempted to address this funding shortfall. As a result of the passage of DEP's 7&7 Plan and the increased revenues
that resulted from this plan, DEP's Special Reclamation Program has been able
to make progress in eliminating the backlog of unreclaimed mine sites throughout West Virginia. Whether a legal structure is now in place that will guarantee
the elimination of the backlog of unreclaimed mine sites and the expeditious
reclamation of newly abandoned and unreclaimed mine sites remains to be seen.
One must hope that West Virginia's seemingly eternal struggle to achieve a fiscally and environmentally adequate coal mining reclamation bonding program
will eventually reach a satisfactory end.

528

Interoffice Memorandum from Roger Green, West Virginia Division of Environmental

Protection, to Pat Park 1 (Jan. 8, 1999).
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